Legislative Activity and Effectiveness in the U.S. States

Abstract: Producing policy is one of the key functions of legislatures. Voters elect legislators with the expectation they will pass policies, but the ability of legislators to accomplish this task varies. Numerous studies have examined why some legislators are more active and effective in completing this task; however, much of this research has either focused on legislative activity and effectiveness at the Congressional level or has relied on surveys of elites to generate reputational scores of effectiveness at the state level. So, while we have some idea of the individual factors that affect legislative activity and effectiveness in Congress or perceptions of legislative effectiveness in the states, we have little idea of how legislative activity and effectiveness actually varies across institutions. In this study, I examine variations in legislative effectiveness across three state houses (Georgia, Wisconsin, and Vermont) and find that while some previous findings are confirmed, the factors that predict legislative activity and effectiveness vary across institutional settings.

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People vote for elected representatives with the expectation that they will produce public policies. In fact, the key task of legislators is to legislate, or to enact policies. But while this is the critical part of their position, legislators vary in their willingness to introduce policy and in their ability to see those proposals through the legislative process. Research shows that part of this variability is due to the characteristics and activities of legislators themselves, but part of this is also due to the institutional context and advantages that accrue to certain legislators. However, much of the conventional wisdom about the factors that affect legislative activity and effectiveness has been generated at the Congressional level, an institution where many bills are introduced and few bills are enacted into law. From this perspective, many have argued that representatives strategically introduce legislation; members know it is an uphill battle to secure passage of legislation, so they introduce bills to claim credit or to signal to other lawmakers. As Stewart (2001, 338) notes, "Many members of Congress introduce bills they know will never see the light of day. This can be because members either wish to be seen as policy innovators or to use the bill introduction process as a low-cost method of demonstrating that they are on top of popular issues."

Thus, legislators introduce many bills but concentrate their attention on the few bills where their true interests lie, with the more effective legislators being more likely to secure passage of the legislation they truly support. Furthermore, legislators are constrained in their ability to succeed in shepherding bills through the legislature by institutional factors like majority party status, seniority and their position within the leadership hierarchy, with rank and file minority party members at a severe disadvantage.

However, while this conventional wisdom may be true in an institution where the bill passage rate is typically hovers around 5% of all bills introduced, it is less clear if these findings hold true at the state level where enactment rates vary considerably. In 2006, enactment rates ranged from a low of approximately 3.6% of the 3,139 bills introduced in the Minnesota state legislature to a high of over 73% of the 3,176 bills introduced in the Arkansas state legislature (Rosenthal 2009, 308).

This raises numerous questions about our understanding of the legislative process generally. Why do introduction and enactment rates vary across legislative institutions? Credit claiming and position taking may be the norm in institutions with low enactment rates, but this may not be the case in institutions with enactment rates greater than 50%, which describes nine state legislatures. Are the factors that influence legislative productivity and effectiveness the same across the states? While higher sponsorship rates have been found to be related to legislative effectiveness in Congress, in some institutions, legislators are limited in the number of bills they may introduce, suggesting this relationship only holds in some settings. Are different types of legislators more successful in certain types of environments? Some research has found that women are more effective lawmakers in Congress. Are they more effective in all legislatures? If not, what are the features of Congress that are conducive to the success of female legislators?

This paper is a preliminary analysis in a larger project designed to examine these questions. In this paper, I analyze the factors that affect individual legislative activity and effectiveness in three state houses in Georgia, Wisconsin and Vermont. The results reveal that while some of the results from previous research are confirmed, such as the

effect of majority party status, the factors that predict legislative activity and effectiveness vary across institutional settings.

Legislative Effectiveness

Generally speaking, the factors that lead to legislative activity and effectiveness tend to be grouped into three main categories: institutional, environmental (also sometimes termed political context), and individual activities and characteristics. The key determinants of legislative effectiveness in the institutional category are majority party status and leadership status.[1] First, research has confirmed that members of the majority party are more successful in securing passage of legislation they sponsor (Anderson et al 2003; Frantzich 1979; Cox and Terry 2008). Krutz's (2005) examination of the bill winnowing process confirms this as he finds that bills sponsored by majority party members are more likely to continue on in the legislative process.

Over and above any benefit stemming from majority party status, legislators who hold positions of leadership, including party leader and committee chair positions, are also more likely to be successful (Cox and Terry 2008; Frantzich 1979; Hasecke and Mycoff 2007). This is due to the fact that assuming positions of leadership leads to the acquisition of institutional resources that party leaders can use to increase effectiveness. In fact, Hasecke and Mycoff (2007) show that leaders use the institutional resources that they have to reward loyal legislators with legislative success, by referring and scheduling

[1] Scholars often place seniority in the category of institutional factors; this decision stems from the view that seniority confers upon legislators institutional benefits. However, this assumes that all legislatures confer benefits on more senior members; this assumption stems from the fact that most studies of legislative effectiveness examine Congress, where this proposition holds true. But it may be the case that seniority carries few institutional benefits, say in a term limited institution. Thus, I believe it would be more accurate to place seniority in the member characteristics category as it reflects what Miquel and Snyder (2006) term the acquisition of human capital through learning by doing.

their bills in politically advantageous ways. Research has shown that also show that party leaders tend to be more active than other legislators (Frantzich 1979; Hamm, Harmel and Thompson 1983).

The few studies that look at effectiveness at the state level also confirm that majority party status and leadership are positively related to legislative effectiveness, although the findings they present raise interesting questions about these relationships (Ellickson 1992; Hamm, Harmel and Thompson 1983; Haynie and Bratton 1999; Miquel and Snyder 2006). For example, Miquel and Snyder (2006), who examine the North Carolina House, wonder if majority party status may have an even larger effect in other states given that North Carolina is not a particularly strong party state. We do not know the answer to this question as few studies have examined legislative effectiveness comparatively. Ellickson (1992, 295), who examines the Missouri House, notes that the Speaker controls all chair and committee assignments and uses those powers to minimize Republican effectiveness. But Ellickson wrote this assessment at a time when the Missouri Democrats had dominated the House by a 2-1 margin for over 30 years; thus, it is not clear whether Speakers wield their powers to the detriment of minority party members in institutions where there is more competition between the parties. Furthermore, not all party leaders control committee assignments and bill referral in the states; in such states, party leaders may not be able to reward fellow majority party members or even use institutional resources for their own advantage, calling into question the general applicability of these findings.

Second, research has shown that environmental factors, such as electoral safety and the type of district, influence legislative effectiveness, although these factors tend to

have the weakest relationship to legislative effectiveness (Ellickson 1992; Frantzich 1979). Generally speaking, legislators from more competitive districts tend to be less effective; this is due, at least in part, to the fact that such legislators must devote more time and consideration to electoral concerns as opposed to policy or legislative concerns. However, at the state level, Ellickson (1992) finds that electoral competitiveness is unrelated to legislative effectiveness, despite strong evidence for this relationship from those studies that examine this at the national level. What is unclear from these analysis is how competitiveness both at the individual legislator level and at the institutional level influence legislative activity and success. The other environmental factor relevant here is the type of district. Those representing urban districts have been found to be more effective legislators (Ellickson 1992; Bratton and Haynie 1999).

Third, characteristics, such as the gender, seniority, legislative specialization and preferences, and activities of individual legislators have been found to influence legislative activity and effectiveness. For example, one of the most consistent findings in studies of legislative effectiveness is that more senior legislators tend to be more effective legislators (Cox and Terry 2008; Ellickson 1992; Frantzich 1979; Hamm, Harmel and Thompson 1983; Miquel and Snyder 2008). Krutz (2005) finds that seniority is one of the important cues surrounding a bill that determine which bills gain further consideration. Additionally, Miquel and Snyder (2008) find no evidence that effectiveness eventually declines with tenure and argue that this increase in effectiveness is the result of learning-by-doing. They note that this means that term limits may impost substantial costs in terms of loss of legislative effectiveness. However, since the North

Carolina legislature does not have term limits, they cannot test how seniority is related to legislative effectiveness in a term-limited legislature.

The level and type of activities legislators engage in can affect their success rates too. For example, party loyalty, both through roll call voting and campaign contributions, can lead to greater legislative effectiveness for majority party members (Hasecke and Mycoff 2007). Anderson et al (2003) find greater levels of activity leads to more success, although past a certain point, the returns on activity diminish and actually grow negative. But while higher levels of sponsorship in Congress provides leads to greater success, some state legislatures constrain the number of bills that legislators can introduce in a given legislative session, precluding them from engaging in more activity. Furthermore, as noted above, in some state legislatures, most bills pass; it is not clear if more activity is required to secure passage of legislation in these institutions. It could be that legislators in these institutions are all active and effective, or it could be that activity levels are unrelated to effectiveness in these chambers.

Next, some research has shown that women are equally likely to achieve passage of the bills they introduce, after taking into account factors likely seniority, preferences and institutional position (Jeydel and Tayler 2003; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1991, 1994) although Volden and Wiseman (2008; see also Volden, Wiseman and Wittmer 2010) find women are more effective legislators. Furthermore, Bratton and Haynie (1999) find that there is some state variation in success rates, with women in Maryland being less likely and women in California being more likely to achieve passage of their bills. Bratton and Haynie's conflicting findings point to the need to examine legislative effectiveness in a

variety of settings, in order to determine the conditions under which different types of legislators will be more or less effective.[2]

While there has been a growing body of research examining legislative activity and effectiveness, few of these studies examine the question in a comparative fashion, leaving numerous remaining questions about legislative activity and effectiveness. First, why do activity and enactment rates vary? Are the factors that influence legislative activity and effectiveness the same across states? Are different types of legislators more active and successful in certain types of legislative environments? This analysis is part of a larger project designed to answer some of these question; I begin here with a preliminary look at the last question: how are individual factors related to legislative productivity and effectiveness in a variety of institutional settings?

Methodology

For this preliminary study, data was collected on bills introduced in the 2007-2008 session of the Georgia, Vermont and Wisconsin House.[3] As many have noted, the states offer ideal settings to examine how institutional and state level factors affect legislatures and their outputs. In choosing the states for this preliminary analysis, several practical criteria were paramount. First, information on bill history needed to be available on the internet, and second, the number of bills introduced in a given legislative session needed to be manageable, in terms of initial data entry efforts.[4] As Table 1

[2] Bratton and Haynie's (1999) analysis of legislative effectiveness is one the few examinations of legislative effectiveness that looks at multiple legislative institutions (six states in this case). However, they only examine a sample of bills in these institutions, namely women's interest or black interest bills.
[3] Data collection efforts for this project continue. Information on bills from several additional states will be added in the coming months.
[4] For example, Rosenthal (2009) notes that 17,700 bills were introduced in the New York legislature and 5,400 were introduced in Massachusetts in the 2006 legislative session. For this preliminary study, I

shows, in the 2007-2008 session, 1,493 bills were introduced in the Georgia House, 896 bills were introduced in the Vermont House, and 986 bills were introduced in the Wisconsin House. Enactment rates ranged from 11.4% in Wisconsin and 15.6% in Vermont to 37.4% in Georgia, so enactment rates in these chambers are generally higher than those in Congress.

Next, I looked for variation in legislative professionalism, party control and region of the country. For the latter, there is a state from each census region, with the exception of the West. According to Squire (2007), Wisconsin is the 3rd most professional state legislature, Vermont is the 28th and Georgia is the 37th, so there is good variation on this measure. The Vermont House was controlled by the Democrats, as was the Vermont Senate, while both the Wisconsin and Georgia Houses were controlled by the Republican party. Georgia also had unified government, but Wisconsin had divided government, with the Democrats controlling the Senate.

Finally, I wanted to be able to examine the effectiveness of female and black legislators, so I had to choose at least one state that had a significant number of each of these populations. According for the Center for American Women and Politics (2007), 37.8% of the members of the lower chamber in Vermont were women (overall, they ranked first among the states in terms of the percent of female legislators). In Georgia, 44 out of 180 representatives were African American; only Alabama and Mississippi have a greater percentage of African American legislators (NBCSL 2008). Therefore, while these states do not represent a random sample of the U.S. states, they do vary on several key characteristics.

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decided to focus on legislatures where the number of bills sponsored was considerably less than this so as to keep the data entry effort manageable.

Currently, I have gathered data from the official state legislative website, including with data on the sponsorship of each bill, committee referrals, the number of amendments proposed and adopted (and by whom they were proposed), and the length of time it takes for each bill to progress through the legislative process. As data collection is ongoing, this study examines the first components of this data set, legislative activity and effectiveness. For legislative activity, I have calculated several measures about the sponsorship of bills. First, for each legislator, I calculated the number of bills that were sponsored and co-sponsored (TOTAL), the number of bills sponsored alone (SINGLE) and the number of bills on which the legislator was the lead sponsor, which includes singly sponsored bills (LEAD). As Table 1 shows, there is a good deal of variation in sponsorship activity just in these three states. In Wisconsin, legislators are less likely to sponsor bills alone; only 5.1% of all bills had one sponsor, compared to 30.5% in Georgia and 32.7% in Vermont. However, legislators in Wisconsin are also more likely to co-sponsor bills; legislators in that chamber signed on to an average of approximately 106 bills, as compared to 28 and 38 in Georgia and Vermont respectively. These patterns are reflected in the average number sponsors per bill in these states, with bills in Wisconsin having a much higher average.

Next, for legislative effectiveness, I calculated the percent of bills that received committee action (COMMITTEE), the percent that moved to the Senate (SENATE), and the percent that were sent to the Governor (GOVERNOR).[5] Due to the small number of bills that were sponsored alone, I calculated these measures both for the total number of bills sponsored as well as the number of bills for which a legislator was the lead sponsor.

[5] I also calculated the percent that were signed into law, but there were so few vetoes in these states that this measure was essentially the same as the percent sent to the Governor.

There is a good deal of debate about the appropriate way to measure legislative effectiveness; in the future, alternative measure of legislative effectiveness will be examined as well.

This analysis focuses on individual level factors that may affect legislative success, with individual legislators as the unit of analysis. Thus, I include controls for partisanship; partisanship is simply measured as a legislator's party identification (0=Republican, 1=Democrat).[6] Each state is examined separately here, so I have not included controls for majority party although the party variable can be easily interpreted as majority party status as well. Controls are included for a legislator's race and gender; females and African Americans are coded as one for these dummy variables. I have a measure of the number of years a given legislator has served as well as the percent of the vote he or she received in the last election. I have also included controls for legislative leadership, both for committee chairs and party leaders. Finally, for the legislative effectiveness models, I have included the total number of bills sponsored or co-sponsored as some have found that greater activity leads to more success (Anderson et al 2003).

Analysis

The above variables were first used to predict legislative activity. The models presented in Table 2 generally speaking do not do a very good job of explaining variance in legislative activity. The variance explained ranges from a high of 27.8% in the lead sponsorship model in Georgia to a low of 7.7% of the variance explained in singly sponsored bills in Vermont. Nonetheless, there are some interesting findings. Party is related to activity in a manner that would be expected, given previous research, in

[6] Vermont has 3 Progressive Party members. These legislators were excluded from this analysis.

Georgia and Vermont. In these chambers, majority party membership is positively related to legislative activity. Republican legislators sign on to more bills and are more likely to be lead sponsors in Georgia, while in Vermont, Democrats sign on to more bills. But, in Wisconsin, party is unrelated to legislative activity.

In both Georgia and Wisconsin, African American legislators are less active; this variable is significant in all three models in Georgia, a chamber with the highest percent African American of these chambers and that is controlled by Republicans. This variable is also negatively related to lead sponsorship in Wisconsin, which is also controlled by Republicans. Given the similarities in party control and the fact that African American legislators tend to be more liberal, this variable may be serving as a proxy for ideology here. African Americans may be less likely to sponsor bills as they know, given institutional constraints, their bills will be less likely to go anywhere. Of course, female legislators tend to be more liberal as well, but this variable is not significantly related to any of the activity variables, so it may not be a proxy for ideology. It may be, as Bratton and Haynie (1999) found in three of the states they examined, that race is related to activity and effectiveness.

Looking at the leadership variables, party leaders in Georgia are significantly more active, while party leaders in Vermont are significantly less active. Previous research has found that party leaders are more active than other legislators (Frantzich 1979; Hamm, Harmel and Thompson 1983), but this appears to only be true in some institutional settings. Committee chairs are also more active, in Georgia and Wisconsin, but no more active in Vermont. Thus, a somewhat complicated pattern emerges in these three states. In Georgia, all leaders are more active. In Wisconsin, only committee chairs

are more active, while in Vermont, party leaders are *less* active. These results suggest that institutional context plays a role here.

In both Vermont and Wisconsin, tenure in the legislature is associated with higher levels of legislative activity. Interestingly, in Vermont, this variable is not significant for the total number of bills sponsored, only for the lead and single models. In these chambers then, more senior legislators are more active, particularly with respect to taking the lead in introducing legislation. However, tenure is unrelated to activity in the Georgia House. Finally, electoral margin is only significantly related to activity in Georgia; here, higher margins are related to less activity. This suggests that electorally vulnerable legislators may be introducing more legislation to engage in some credit claiming.

Tables 3 and 4 show the results for the models predicting legislative effectiveness; Table 3 contains the effectiveness models for the total number of bills sponsored, while Table 4 models lead sponsorship. In both tables, the models explain significantly more variance in the dependent variables in Wisconsin than they do in Georgia and Vermont. In the latter two states, the largest amount of variance explained is in the total number of sponsored bills that make it out of committee in Vermont (see Table 3); here, 12.9% of the variance is explained. In contrast, the largest amount of variance explained in Wisconsin is 72.5% of the total bills that make it into the Senate (see Table 3). However, while a good deal of variance is explained in the first two models in both tables for Wisconsin, the variance explained in the Wisconsin models for the percent that go to the governor is low (Tables 3 and 4). This probably reflects the impact of divided government. Legislators who are skillful in shepherding their bills out of the House are stymied when it comes to moving bills through a chamber controlled by the other party.

Looking across both tables, there are consistent findings for some variables. First, members of the majority party are generally more effective legislators, confirming past research. Republicans are more effective in Georgia and Wisconsin, while Democrats are more effective in Vermont. The effects in the former two states are fairly large. For example, in looking at table 3, Republicans have 14% more bills clear committee in Georgia and 20% more in Wisconsin as compared to Democrats. The effects are smaller in Vermont, where Democrats will have 4% more bills clear committee. Interestingly, this variable is unrelated to effectiveness for lead sponsorship in any of the models for Vermont, as is shown in Table 4.

Next, in Georgia and Wisconsin, the number of bills sponsored is negatively related to legislative effectiveness. The magnitude of impact for this variable is not large though; for instance in Georgia, every one additional bill sponsored leads to .15% fewer bills making it out of committee. This conflicts with Anderson et al's (2003) and Frantzich's (1979) findings and suggests that a shotgun approach to legislating is less effective than a targeted approach in these chambers.

While race was negatively related to legislative activity, it appears to be largely unrelated to legislative effectiveness. The only exception is in table 3 in the committee model in Wisconsin, where race is negatively related to the number of bills that make it out of committee. After this though, race has no impact on further progress. Gender is only significantly related to legislative effectiveness in Vermont, in the lead sponsored models. Here, women are more effective legislators; for example, a female legislator in the Vermont House had 10% more bills make it out of committee. Interestingly, Vermont also has the largest proportion of females of any of these chambers; this may

confirm critical mass theory, in that more female legislators has led to greater legislative success for women this chamber. It may also be the case that the leadership in this chamber is sympathetic to the concerns of female legislators; women are overrepresented in the legislative leadership, including both party leaders and committee chairs, as 54.5% of the legislative leadership was female even though women comprise only 38% of the members.

Legislative leadership is significantly related to legislative effectiveness in these states. Of the 18 models in tables 3 and 4, party leadership is significant in 6 models, while the committee chair variable is significant in 2. In Wisconsin, party leaders are generally more effective legislators; this variable is positively related to effectiveness in five of the models for this state. Committee chairs are also more effective legislators in Wisconsin; this variable is significant in two of the lead sponsor models here. Thus, in Wisconsin, which is the most professional legislature under examination here, leadership is related to effectiveness in the same way that it is in Congress. However, party leadership is negatively related to legislative effectiveness in Vermont, although this variable is only significant in the committee model in Table 3. Here, party leaders see 10% fewer bills make it out of committee. In both Vermont and Georgia, the committee chair variables are consistently positive, but never significant.

Contrary to Miquel and Snyder's (2006) findings, tenure in office is basically unrelated to legislative effectiveness in these chambers. This variable was only significant once; in Georgia, more senior legislators have .8% more bills where they are the lead sponsor make it out of committee, hardly an overwhelming difference. Thus, in these chambers, it does not appear that legislators are learning by doing. Finally, the

electoral margin, or vote percent, is significantly related to effectiveness five times in Georgia and Wisconsin. In these states, legislators with a greater vote percent are *less* effective legislators, contrary to Frantzich (1979) who finds electoral margin is positively related to effectiveness and Anderson et al (2003), Hasecke and Mycoff (2007) and Ellickson (1992) who find that margin is unrelated to effectiveness although this is the case in Vermont.

Discussion

The analysis presented here confirms some findings from previous research, but also reveals that the factors that influence legislative activity and effectiveness vary across institutional settings. For example, the results confirm that majority party members are generally speaking more active and effective legislators. The results also show that race is negatively related to legislative activity, although without controls for ideology it is difficult to confirm the meaning of this significant relationship. Finally, tenure in office is positively related to activity in Wisconsin and Vermont, although it is unrelated to effectiveness in these states.

However, the most important findings of this analysis is the lack of consistency both across these three chambers and in comparison to previous research examining Congress. This is even true for how well the models perform, with the models explaining far more of the variance in the Wisconsin House, the most professional legislature under examination here, than in Georgia and Vermont. To illustrate further, research examining Congress has generally found that party leaders are more active and effective legislators. While this is true for party leaders in Wisconsin and committee chairs in Wisconsin and Georgia, party leaders in Vermont are actually less active and effective.

An examination of the powers, duties and resources available to these party leaders and committee chairs will be critical to sorting out these relationship.

Research at the national level has also found that electoral margin is positively related to legislative activity and effectiveness and that legislative activity is positively related to effectiveness. However, neither of these findings were confirmed in these states here. Electoral margin is *negatively* related to legislative effectiveness in Georgia and activity is *negatively* related to effectiveness in Wisconsin and Vermont.

Clearly then, what is needed is an examination of the institutional and environmental factors that condition these individual level relationships. As data collection for this projection is ongoing, this is the next step in this project. With the additional states and more sophisticated models, the goal is to develop more general theories about the factors that predict legislative activity and effectiveness in a variety of institutional settings.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Georgia	Vermont	Wisconsin
Legislative Professionalism (State Rank)	.116 (37)	.144 (28)	.439 (3)
% Democrats	42.1%	61.8%	46.5%
% Female	22.2%	38.2%	23.2%
% African American	23.5%	0%	6.1%
Bills Introduced	1493	898	986
Bills Enacted (% Enacted)	558 (37.4%)	140 (15.6%)	112 (11.4%)
% Bills with 1 Sponsor	30.5%	32.7%	5.1%
Average Sponsors Per Bill	3.4	6.5	12.4
Average Total Sponsored	27.78	37.54	105.88
Average Singly Sponsored	2.49	1.89	.47
Average Lead Sponsored	8.09	5.42	9.32

Note: Legislative Professionalism comes from Squire (2007).

Table 2: Modeling Legislative Activity

	Georgia			Vermont			Wisconsin	
	Total	**Lead**	**Single**	**Total**	**Lead**	**Single**	**Total**	**Lead**
Party	-8.06* (3.28)	-.283* (1.27)	-.372 (.816)	6.26* (2.73)	1.82 (1.18)	.331 (.507)	8.22 (20.48)	3.26 (2.20)
Gender	-2.72 (.295)	-1.85 (1.14)	-.772 (.734)	-.087 (2.592)	-.319 (1.12)	-.402 (.480)	11.27 (17.87)	.374 (1.92)
Race	-8.09* (3.44)	-2.85* (1.32)	-1.60^ (.853)				11.27 (32.45)	-6.99* (3.48)
Party Leader	8.68^ (4.72)	.384 (1.82)	-.636 (1.17)	-35.82*** (8.78)	-7.41^ (3.80)	-1.692 (1.627)	-21.98 (14.39)	-.320 (1.54)
Committee Chair	9.51** (3.25)	4.097** (1.25)	1.52^ (.809)	-6.21 (4.82)	.431 (2.09)	1.26 (.893)	66.05** (20.41)	7.22** (2.20)
Tenure	-.117 (.159)	-.021 (.061)	.028 (.479)	.087 (.223)	.544*** (.097)	.118** (.041)	2.09* (1.02)	.297** (.109)
Vote Percent	-.013 (.071)	-.052^ (.027)	-.041* (.018)	12.64 (7.26)	1.95 (3.14)	-.773 (1.344)	-.231 (.331)	-.037 (.036)
R^2	.258	.278	.117	.108	.219	.077	.160	.179
N	177	177	177	142	142	142	99	99

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients, entries in parentheses are standard errors. *** p <.001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10

Table 3: Modeling Legislative Effectiveness – Total Sponsored

	Georgia			Vermont			Wisconsin		
	Committee	**Senate**	**Governor**	**Committee**	**Senate**	**Governor**	**Committee**	**Senate**	**Governor**
Party	-14.05*** (3.86)	-12.58** (3.94)	-10.165** (3.68)	4.02** (1.39)	2.71* (1.35)	2.34* (1.15)	-24.05*** (2.53)	-22.26*** (2.09)	-.605 (.990)
Gender	-2.03 (3.42)	-1.39 (3.94)	-1.38 (3.68)	.644 (1.29)	-1.54 (.126)	.062 (1.07)	.739 (2.53)	.611 (1.85)	-.500 (.875)
Race	2.98 (4.03)	-2.90 (4.11)	-5.02 (3.84)				-9.05* (4.00)	-2.76 (3.32)	.297 (1.57)
Party Leader	-.480 (5.51)	1.48 (5.63)	-1.23 (5.26)	-10.61* (4.63)	-6.46 (4.51)	-5.22 (3.83)	3.17^ (1.80)	2.81^ (1.49)	1.18^ (.704)
Committee Chair	4.99 (3.85)	4.73 (3.94)	4.16 (3.68)	3.53 (2.14)	1.10 (2.35)	1.81 (2.00)	1.10 (2.66)	1.48 (2.20)	2.00^ (1.04)
Tenure	.236 (.185)	.257 (.189)	.202 (176)	-.124 (.111)	-.010 (.108)	-.085 (3.02)	-.176 (.128)	-.035 (.106)	-.020 (.050)
Vote Percent	-.065 (.082)	-.048 (.084)	-.037 (.078)	6.66^ (3.65)	3.95 (3.55)	3.58 (3.02)	-.061 (.041)	-.070* (.034)	-.031^ (.016)
Number Sponsored	-.153^ (.089)	-.187* (.091)	-1.49^ (.075)	.048 (.043)	.054 (.042)	.041 (.035)	-.016 (.03)	-.018^ (.011)	.009^ (.005)
R^2	.099	.108	.107	.129	.037	.046	.693	.725	.190
N	177	177	177	142	142	142	99	99	99

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients, entries in parentheses are standard errors. *** p <.001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10

Table 4: Modeling Legislative Effectiveness – Total Lead Sponsor

	Georgia			Vermont			Wisconsin		
	Committee	**Senate**	**Governor**	**Committee**	**Senate**	**Governor**	**Committee**	**Senate**	**Governor**
Party	-15.37* (6.99)	-15.34* (6.77)	7.06 (6.61)	.768 (4.97)	-1.81 (4.66)	-2.66 (4.61)	-35.38*** (6.31)	-28.14*** (5.29)	-4.87 (3.98)
Gender	-3.35 (6.30)	-4.22 (.6.10)	-.411 (5.96)	10.52* (4.54)	7.58^ (4.26)	8.29^ (4.21)	-.214 (5.73)	.582 (4.81)	1.32 (3.62)
Race	9.63 (7.45)	-.750 (7.22)	-7.72 (7.05)				11.56 (11.97)	10.87 (10.03)	11.86 (7.55)
Party Leader	-2.59 (9.81)	-.892 (9.50)	-5.17 (9.28)	-14.20 (26.64)	-11.64 (23.11)	-9.70 (22.86)	8.42^ (4.51)	7.08^ (3.78)	1.728 (2.84)
Committee Chair	4.79 (6.86)	1.79 (6.65)	1.51 (6.50)	2.68 (8.18)	2.08 (7.67)	3.05 (7.59)	13.48* (6.63)	13.15* (5.55)	6.18 (4.18)
Tenure	.406 (.347)	.801* (.336)	.356 (.328)	-.074 (.378)	-.056 (.354)	-.096 (.350)	.529 (.340)	.467 (.285)	.160 (.215)
Vote Percent	-.238 (.146)	-.261^ (.141)	-.231^ (.138)	1.51 (12.98)	-.671 (12.17)	-1.02 (12.04)	-.129 (.102)	-.145^ (.086)	-.077 (.065)
Number Sponsored	-.414* (.158)	-.462** (.153)	-.376* (.150)	-.082 (.150)	-.081 (.141)	-.092 (.139)	-.050 (.032)	-.069* (.027)	-.016 (.020)
R^2	.041	.082	.041	.057	.037	.046	.480	.484	.063
N	169	169	169	116	116	116	96	96	96

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients, entries in parentheses are standard errors. *** p <.001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10