

Welfare Policymaking and Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in U.S. State
Legislatures

Beth Reingold
(beth.reingold@emory.edu)

and

Adrienne R. Smith
(adrienne.smith@emory.edu)

Emory University
Department of Political Science
Atlanta, GA 30322

Paper presented at the annual
State Politics and Policy Conference
June 3-5, 2010
Springfield, IL

Acknowledgements: The authors thank Jessica Harrell for her research assistance and the Institute for Advanced Policy Solutions, the Provost's Strategic Fund, and the Department of Women's Studies at Emory University for their research support. Portions of this research were supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-0618368, Kathleen A. Bratton, Kerry L. Haynie, and Beth Reingold, Principal Investigators). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the "Reducing Poverty: Assessing Recent State Policy Innovations and Strategies" Conference (November 2009) and the Department of Political Science Brownbag (March 2010) at Emory University. We thank our colleagues for their very helpful comments.

Abstract

In all the research on state-level variation in welfare policy, one thing is clear: race, ethnicity, and representation matter. In this paper, we argue that gender matters as well. Our primary research question is whether the election and incorporation of women into state legislatures has any effect on state welfare policy. Adopting an *intersectional* approach, we put women of color front and center analytically and ask whether their relationship to welfare policy and policymaking differs from that of other women and men of color. We gauge the impact of state legislative women and women of color on numerous dimensions of state TANF policy, including benefit levels and the various rules and regulations used to determine eligibility, enforce work requirements, and promote more “responsible” behavior. Our findings are highly contingent: depending on which women and which policies one examines, the presence and power of legislative women had a liberal effect, a conservative effect, or no effect. Yet one thing is clear: the presence and power of legislative women of color mattered most—more than the presence and power of other women, and more than the presence and power of men of color. Our analysis, therefore, demonstrates the utility of an intersectional approach to the study of representation and welfare policymaking—one that takes into account the simultaneous and overlapping nature of race, ethnicity, gender, and class, and that focuses attention on the diversity among women, within racial/ethnic minority groups, and among the poor.

In many ways, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) passed by Congress and signed into law in 1996 by then-President Bill Clinton marked a new era in American welfare policy. Gone was the federal entitlement to means-tested welfare benefits in the form of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Taking its place, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) is restricted to a lifetime maximum of five years, contingent upon work-related activity outside the home (on the part of adult recipients), and subject to numerous sanctions for uncooperative or unproductive behavior. Its primary goals are to reduce welfare caseloads by instilling or otherwise requiring more “responsible” behavior on the part of recipients. And while the PRWORA imposes a number of federal goals, limits, and minimal requirements, it also grants the states a great deal more discretion over welfare policy than they had under AFDC. Within a certain range, states could choose just how “temporary” and how generous TANF benefits could be, as well as how strictly or rigidly the work requirements and behavioral sanctions would be imposed. Not surprisingly, this devolution of policymaking power to the states has resulted in widespread variation among the states—and a great deal of research seeking to explain that variation.

In all the research on state TANF policy, one thing is clear: race, race relations, and racial politics have had a profound impact. As was the case with AFDC (Brown 1995; Fording 2003; Hero 1998; Johnson 2001, 2003; Plotnick and Winters 1985, 1990; Volden 2002), the more racially diverse the state welfare rolls (or the state population), the less generous the TANF benefits and the more rigid the rules and regulations governing eligibility and work requirements (Avery & Peffley 2005; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Larimer 2005; Preuhs

2007; Soss et al. 2001).¹ State policymakers, it appears, have responded to or internalized the racial stereotypes, resentments, and fears that shape judgments of the deservingness of welfare recipients and that drive the call for less generous, get-tough welfare reform among the white mass public (Dyck and Hussey 2008; Gilens 1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Soss et al. 2003).

There is growing evidence, however, that the presence and power of African Americans and Latinos in state legislatures can offset or counteract this sort of racial backlash (Fording 2003; Owens 2005; Preuhs 2006, 2007). In effect, states with relatively large proportions of Black and Latino citizens and welfare recipients would have even less generous welfare benefits and rules if they had not managed to elect Black and Latino representatives—and if those Black and Latino representatives had not managed to accumulate some modicum of legislative power.

The research thus far contributes greatly to our understanding of the racialization of American welfare policy and politics, as well as the significance of the election and political incorporation of racial and ethnic minorities in the states. Notably missing from this literature, however, is sustained attention to the *gendered* nature of American welfare policy and politics, and the role of female policymakers in the states. As we argue below, it is the gendered nature of American welfare policy and politics that makes the question of women's representation worth investigating. Our inquiry begins, therefore, with the question of whether the election and incorporation of women into state legislatures has any effect on state welfare policy.

¹ These racial dynamics seem to be triggered not only by larger populations of African Americans, but also by relatively large populations of Latinos. Both are associated with harsher state welfare policies. No one, to our knowledge, has investigated or even theorized the potential effects of other racial/ethnic minority populations (e.g., Asian Americans or Native American) on state welfare policy.

We acknowledge, however, that the politics of welfare may not be properly understood in terms of *either* race *or* gender. More likely, welfare policymaking in the states is (and always has been) “raced-gendered” (Hawkesworth 2003)—shaped simultaneously by both racial and gender politics (and, of course, class politics). For that reason, we take an *intersectional* approach to the study of welfare policy, recognizing race, gender, and class as multiple axes of intersecting, interacting, and/or interdependent political forces (Collins 2000; Crenshaw 1989; Hancock 2007). Such an approach questions whether research on “women” is, indeed, applicable to all women regardless of race, ethnicity, class, and other relevant dimensions of social status and political power; and it questions whether research on “African Americans” or “Latinos” is applicable to all regardless of gender and other social cleavages. We therefore put women of color front and center analytically and ask whether their relationship to welfare policy and policymaking differs from that of other women and men of color. Standing at the intersection of the “raced-gendered” politics of welfare, women of color arguably have the most at stake (Hawkesworth 2003). In the relationship between representation and welfare policy, then, does the presence and power of *women of color* in state legislatures matter most?

In the analysis that follows, we gauge the impact of state legislative women overall and of legislative women of color in particular on numerous dimensions of state TANF policy, including benefit levels and the various rules and regulations states use to determine eligibility, enforce work requirements, and promote more “responsible” behavior. We develop and test the hypothesis that the greater the political incorporation of women—especially women of color—in the state legislature, the more generous, flexible, and lenient the state TANF policy. In doing so, we build upon, bridge, and contribute to multiple research agendas, including the study of

comparative (U.S.) state politics and policymaking; the politics of poverty and social welfare; and the politics of race, gender, and representation.

Ours is not the first attempt to gauge the impact of legislative women on state-level policy (Cammisa and Reingold 2004; Reingold 2008), or even on TANF policy itself (Cowell-Meyer and Langbein 2009; Poggione 2004b), but it is one of the very few. Additional research that expands our empirical knowledge is certainly warranted. Moreover, we believe an intersectional approach can add valuable theoretical and empirical insight. By focusing on the racial/ethnic diversity among women, our analysis reveals that the impact of legislative women on state welfare policy is highly contingent: depending on which women and which policies one examines, the presence and power of legislative women had a liberal effect, a conservative effect, or no effect. Yet one thing is clear: the presence and power of legislative women of color mattered most—more than the presence and power of other women, and more than the presence and power of men of color. We therefore conclude that the study of representation and welfare policymaking must take into account the simultaneous and overlapping nature of race, ethnicity, gender, and class, and fully acknowledge the diversity among women, within racial/ethnic minority groups, and among the poor.

Intersections of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity in U.S. Welfare Policy and Politics

Welfare policy and politics in the U.S. are gendered in many of the same ways welfare policy and politics are raced. One can see it in the demographic composition of welfare recipients and the poor more generally; in the history of social welfare policy and policy implementation; in public opinion; and in the behavior of elected officials. In all of these arenas, gender biases and gender differences suggest that welfare is very much a “women’s issue” and

that those who advocate for and actively represent women on this issue will fight to make welfare policy more generous and accessible—in effect, more women-friendly.

Researchers have long noted the “feminization of poverty”—the fact that women in the U.S. (and around the world) are more likely than men to live below the poverty line (Christopher et al. 2002; McLanahan and Kelly 1999; Pearce 1978). According to the most recent (2008) Census figures, the poverty rate for women and girls (14.4%) is approximately two percent higher than that for men and boys (12.0%) (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). That translates into almost 4.5 million more females than males living in poverty.² Because poverty assistance in the U.S. (as opposed to Social Security, unemployment, or veterans’ benefits) is targeted almost exclusively to poor families with dependent children and most of those families are headed by women (usually by themselves), adult welfare recipients are almost always female. In FY1996, right before the transition to TANF, 87% of all adult AFDC recipients were female.³ Under TANF, little has changed; now (FY2006), a full 90% of all adult recipients are female.⁴

These figures only begin to capture the myriad ways in which social welfare policy, from colonial times to the present, has been gendered. In its design and implementation, the American welfare state has been quite selective, extending its most generous assistance to those “deserving” women whose morals, marital status, sexuality, and reproductive lives comport with dominant gender and family norms (e.g., widows with small children). For those deemed undeserving (e.g., unmarried mothers), assistance has been either denied altogether, or meted out

² Sex differences in poverty rates are even greater among the adult population (18 years and older), and most pronounced among the elderly (65 years and older).

³ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1997, <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/character/FY96/index96.html>, accessed 25 October 2009

⁴ (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2007, <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/annualreport8/chapter10/chap10.htm>, accessed 25 October 2009)

in the most miserly, intrusive and punitive fashion (Abramovitz 1996; Fineman 1996; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Gordon 1994; Mink 1995, 1998). More often than not, women who have received welfare benefits have been subject to government surveillance and regulation of their personal lives, not simply to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse, but also to ensure morally “suitable” homes and proper parenting (Abramovitz 1996; Mettler 2000; Mink 1995; Smith 2007).

PRWORA is certainly not the first attempt to regulate women’s lives (Abramovitz 1996), police women’s sexuality (Smith 2007), and instill more “personal responsibility” among low-income single mothers (Mettler 2000). But it may be the most emphatic and explicit. Indeed, the welfare reform movement that culminated in PRWORA was, in many respects, an unabashedly paternalistic response to the perceived failure of AFDC to accomplish these tasks (Mead 1997).

The very purpose of TANF, as stated in the PRWORA is to:

(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families (Pub. L. No. 104-193 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) at 2113; cited in Smith 2007, 89).⁵

Despite the gender-neutral terminology (families, parents, recipients, units, etc.) used here and elsewhere, TANF is, by design, steeped in gender politics.

Public opinion on welfare is also gendered, in several ways. For decades, national surveys have shown women to be significantly more liberal than men on various social welfare issues. Shapiro and Mahajan (1986), for example, show that throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and across hundreds of survey items and multiple survey organizations, women were

⁵ According to Smith (2007, 94), “none of the purpose statements in previous federal welfare laws defined the ADC/AFDC program as a State initiative designed to promote marriage, reduce out-of-wedlock births, or encourage two-parent families.”

more supportive of a government role in providing jobs, minimal incomes, health care, and other types of aid to the poor, dispossessed, and needy (see also, Cook and Wilcox 1991; Public Opinion 1982). During the heat of the welfare reform debates of the 1990s, such gender gaps in support for a public “safety net” were well established—so much so that numerous political scientists argued that they were a major cause of gender gaps in party preferences and vote choices (CAWP 1997; Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998; Clark and Clark 1999; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Schlesinger and Heldman 2001). Extensive analysis of the biannual American National Election Study (ANES) also reveals that since the 1960s, women have been more likely than men to cite poverty as an important national problem and poverty alleviation as a national policy priority (O’Brien 2004; see also CAWP 1997).

Public opinion on welfare may be gendered in more subtle, but no less significant, ways. As the research on race and welfare has demonstrated, one of the most powerful ways race affects public support for (or, more frequently, opposition to) welfare spending is through its effects on white people’s beliefs about welfare recipients. Those who believe, for example, that most people who receive welfare are black, and that blacks are “lazy” or less committed to the work ethic than others, are more likely to oppose government welfare spending (Gilens 1999; see also Dyck and Hussey 2008; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Soss et al. 2003).⁶ Foster’s (2008) research suggests, however, that “antipathy towards welfare is driven by more than just race” and racial stereotypes (p. 171). Gender stereotypes, or “gender specific assumptions about the sexual and reproductive behavior of welfare recipients” (Foster 2008, 173), can also fuel opposition to welfare spending. Survey respondents who believe that receiving welfare

⁶ Soss et al. (2003) demonstrate that negative stereotypes and feelings toward Hispanics have equally powerful effects on white support for welfare reform measures such as time limits and family caps.

encourages women to have more children than they otherwise would are more likely to oppose any increase in welfare spending (Foster 2008, 172).

While there is no comparable research on policymakers' attitudes toward welfare recipients, there is evidence to suggest that gender gaps in the policy preferences and priorities of the electorate are reflected in those of elected officials. Across decades of surveys and roll-call votes, women in state legislatures, as well as Congress, are more liberal than their male colleagues on many of the issues that elicit gender gaps in public opinion surveys, as well as on composite measures of political ideology (e.g., Burrell 1994; Diamond 1977; Dodson 2006; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Epstein, Niemi, and Powell 2005; Swers 2002; Welch 1985). The one study to examine gender differences in legislators' *welfare* policy preferences specifically (Poggione 2004a) is particularly instructive, for it is based on a 2000 national survey of *state* legislators that included 17 questions about a wide array of TANF-era reforms. According to Poggione (2004a, 305), female lawmakers "hold more liberal preferences on welfare policy than their male colleagues, even after accounting for other factors like constituency demands, party, and ideology."⁷

Similarly, a large body of research, spanning multiple decades and levels of office, demonstrates that female officials are more likely to take the lead on "women's issues," whether they are defined in terms of women's rights, women's interests, or women's traditional roles as caretakers (i.e., child and social welfare) (e.g., Bratton 2002; Carroll 2001; Diamond 1977; Dodson 2006; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Saint-Germain 1989; Swers 2002; Thomas 1994; Wolbrecht 2002). Studies that have examined legislative leadership on welfare or anti-poverty

⁷ Interestingly, Poggione (2004, 312) also reports that Republican women's welfare policy preferences are only slightly less liberal than Democratic women's; plus, gender differences are more pronounced among Republicans than among Democrats.

issues in particular (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Bratton, Haynie, and Reingold 2006) have found that women are more likely than men to introduce such legislation, even after controlling for party, district demographics, and committee assignments (but see Reingold 2000; Thomas 1994).

The salience of gender in the politics of welfare should in no way negate or cast doubt on the salience of race, however. Rather, welfare politics is one arena in which the intersecting forces of gender and race (along with class and citizenship) are most striking. The raced-gendered nature of welfare is perhaps best understood where it is most powerfully manifested: in the distinctive position—real or imagined—of poor women of color.⁸ It is not simply women, African Americans, or Latinos who are overrepresented among the poor and among recipients of welfare; it is women of color. As the histories of social welfare policy (cited above) make clear, determinations of which women are more or less deserving of assistance, privacy, and dignity have always been tainted by racial and ethnic biases. It is poor women of color who have been subject to the most stringent eligibility requirements, the most intense moral scrutiny, and the harshest penalties welfare policy has to offer.

It is also not simply the racialized (usually black) stereotype of the lazy welfare recipient that has fueled successive waves of increasingly disciplinary welfare reform, but the “controlling image” of the raced-gendered welfare *queen* who wantonly gives birth to multiple children by multiple absentee fathers in order to receive more welfare benefits and avoid working (Collins 2000; Hancock 2004; Lubiano 1992; Sparks 2003; Williams 1995). As portrayed in the media and in welfare policy debates, the (usually black) welfare queen came to symbolize both the

⁸ The bulk of the literature on the relationship between women of color and welfare politics is specific to the experiences of and assumptions about African American women in particular. However, there are some indications that, in recent years as their numbers have increased, the experiences of and assumptions regarding poor Latinas are or are likely to be quite similar (Preuhs 2007; Soss et al. 2003; but see Fox 2004).

typical welfare recipient and all that was wrong with American welfare policy, especially under AFDC (Collins 2000; Hancock 2004; Lubiano 1992; Sparks 2003; Williams 1995). No doubt, the raced-gendered images and assumptions associated with the welfare queen have had a noticeable effect on both public opinion and legislative behavior.

In Foster's (2008) re-analysis of the 1991 National Race and Poverty Survey data, for example, public support for government welfare spending is contingent upon the predicted reproductive behavior of (hypothetical) *black* welfare mothers, not that of white welfare mothers.⁹ O'Brien (2004) finds that, starting in the late 1970s, women no longer spoke in one voice about the need to alleviate poverty. This was about the same time that the number and proportion of African American women on welfare rose (thanks to the civil rights and welfare rights movements, U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and Great Society reforms that withdrew many of the policy tools used to exclude poor women of color from the welfare rolls) and the welfare queen emerged in popular discourse.. Around this time, African American women became much more likely than other women to consider poverty a major national priority.¹⁰ Perhaps as a result, gender gaps in public support for "welfare" spending in particular (as opposed to support for other dimensions of the social welfare state) were noticeably absent in the 1990s and early 2000s; national samples of (mostly white) women and men were equally opposed (Clark and Clark 2006; Gilens 1999; but see Dyck and Hussey 2008).¹¹

⁹ The predicted work behavior of welfare mothers also influences attitudes toward welfare spending, but it makes no difference whether the hypothetical welfare mother is described as black or white (Foster 2008, 175-77).

¹⁰ The attitudes of other women of color (Latinas, Asian American, and Native American women grouped together) were "indistinguishable" from those of white women (O'Brien 2004, 51).

¹¹ By 2004, women were significantly more likely than men to support more welfare spending (Clark and Clark 2008). Nonetheless, women were at least twice as likely to call for more spending on other social welfare programs (e.g., Social Security, child care, or simply helping "the poor") than they were to favor more spending on "welfare" (27%).

The welfare queen, featured so prominently in the congressional discourse on welfare reform (Hancock 2004; Hawkesworth 2003; Sparks 2003; Williams 1995), seems to have had similar effects on the behavior of legislators. According to Hawkesworth (2003, 542-43), “Congresswomen of color were among the most outspoken opponents” of the PRWORA precisely because they saw “the Republican focus on out-of-wedlock births, unwed mothers, and single-women heads of households...[as] a thinly veiled [and sometimes blatant] attack upon poor women of color.” They worked tirelessly to dispel the myths and fears about welfare and welfare recipients, to shape the proposals formulated by others, and to propose alternatives of their own. But while congresswomen of color were united in their opposition to welfare reform in the 103rd and 104th Congresses, their white female colleagues were deeply divided; some, in fact, were on the forefront of efforts to frame poverty and welfare reform in terms of deviant behavior and the lack of “personal responsibility” associated with the welfare queen (Hawkesworth 2003; Hawkesworth et al. 2001).

For all these reasons, one might expect that, at the state legislative level, it is women of color who are the most vocal and active advocates for more generous and less punitive approaches to welfare reform and who, in the end, have the greatest countervailing influence on TANF policy in the states. It might even be the case that what previous studies (e.g., Preuhs 2006, 2007) have characterized as the ability of (all) Black and Latino legislators to “mitigate [welfare] policy backlash,” is really the doing of Black female and Latina legislators. And, given how racially polarized the experience and politics of welfare have been, white female legislators may be more ambivalent about the importance and direction of welfare reform, and more reluctant to become involved. As a result, they may make little or no distinct impression upon state TANF policy.

There are good reasons, however, to doubt whether any female officials—even the most committed and united among them—can affect state policy outcomes on their own, especially on an issue as divisive and racialized as welfare. The women of color who fought so long and hard against welfare reform in Congress met with little success. Even when they had a seat at the table (during the Democratically-controlled 103rd Congress), their efforts were rebuffed or ignored altogether and their credibility was repeatedly impugned (Hawkesworth 2003). In fact, Hawkesworth uses welfare reform as a “particularly appropriate case” for examining the process of “racing-gendering” within Congress and for illustrating the mechanisms by which elected women of color are themselves marginalized and disempowered (2003, 539). Similarly, Smooth’s (2008) in-depth study of African American women serving in the Georgia, Maryland, and Mississippi state legislatures vividly illustrates how women of color can be effectively denied power and influence, despite their (relatively) large numbers, seniority, majority party status, and (in some rare cases) positions of leadership. (See also Darling 1998; Weldon 2006.) Legislative women of color may be the most committed and active advocates for poor women, but they may also be the least influential.¹²

Similarly, even though the research shows that (all) female state legislators are more likely than their male counterparts to support liberal welfare policies (Poggione 2004a) and to sponsor legislation to that effect (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Bratton, Haynie, and Reingold 2006), it is still unclear whether they could, as a group, exert enough influence to significantly impact their states’ TANF policy. When the PRWORA was signed into law in 1996, women had never claimed a majority of the seats in any state legislative chamber. In only three state

¹² Fraga et al. (2008, 158) argue just the opposite: that Latina public officials “are uniquely positioned to leverage the intersectionality of their ethnicity and gender” in ways that enable them “to be the most effective long term advocates on behalf of working class communities of color.”

legislatures did women even come close to a majority (between 30 and 40 percent of the seats in both chambers). In most states (38 to be exact), women held no more than a quarter of the seats in the legislature (CAWP 1996). Perhaps for this reason, studies that have examined the impact of legislative women on state policy outcomes report mixed results, at best. On some issues, such as abortion and child support, studies show that female legislators can and do make difference (Berkman and O'Connor 1993; Crowley 2004; Keiser 1997); but on other "women's issues" such as domestic violence and women's health, female lawmakers have no discernable impact (Tolbert and Steurnagel 2000; Weldon 2004, 2006; see also Jones and Branton 2005).

In one of the most comprehensive studies to date, Cowell-Meyer and Langbein (2009) examine the adoption of 34 women-friendly policies in the states. The percentage of women in state legislatures is associated with the adoption of only eight of those 34 policies; and on three of those eight policies, the relationship is in the opposite direction (more women associated with *lower* odds of adopting women-friendly policy). Interestingly, four of the eight policy adoptions effected (in part) by female legislators concern TANF. Yet, according to Cowell-Meyer and Langbein (2009, 16-17), the presence of more women in the legislature is just as likely to increase the odds of adopting more lenient, women-friendly TANF policy as it is to decrease the odds.¹³

Keiser's (1997) study also suggests that welfare policy is an unlikely arena for female solidarity, mobilization, and influence. As Keiser reports, the impact of female officials on child support collections depends on which population is the beneficiary: families that receive welfare

¹³ Cowell-Meyer and Langbein estimate that an increase of one percent more women in the legislature increases the odds that the state will extend TANF benefits to children born or conceived while their mother was receiving benefits by 18%; increases the average monthly TANF benefit by \$5.83; decreases the odds of extending TANF benefits for 24 months before the recipient is required to work by 11%; and decreases the odds of providing transitional childcare to TANF recipients by 12% (2009, 16-17).

benefits (in this case, AFDC) or families that do not. Women's numerical strength in both state legislatures and county governments is associated with stronger child support enforcement only for non-AFDC clients. Female officials apparently had no impact on the collection of child support payments for AFDC recipients. One explanation for this disparity, Keiser (1997, 146) suggests, is intersectionality: "because socioeconomic factors divide women, female officials...may not be as representative of women on welfare benefits as they are of other women."

Some studies of welfare policymaking are more optimistic about the liberalizing or moderating influence of women in power. In-depth analyses of legislative efforts leading up to the passage of the PRWORA in the Republican-dominated 104th Congress show that some of the more senior, moderate Republican women were able "to temper or moderate some of the harsher effects of the proposed legislation and to expand the legislation to include provisions for child care, child support, and child protection" (Hawkesworth et al. 2001, 46; Dodson 2006). Poggione (2004b) also finds that state legislative women can have an impact on TANF policy, under certain conditions. When the percentage of women in the majority party is high and the majority party holds a slim margin, and when the percentage of women on welfare-related committees is high and the committees are relatively autonomous, TANF policies are significantly more liberal.

As these studies suggest, "sheer numbers" of legislative women may not be enough (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). The impact of women on state policy outputs may also depend on the incorporation of women into dominant coalitions (majority parties) and leadership structures. We therefore anticipate that it is the *combination* of descriptive (numerical) representation and legislative incorporation that enables

women, and women of color especially, to move welfare policy in a more liberal, generous, accommodating, and women-friendly direction (Preuhs 2007).

Models and Measures

To gauge the impact of legislative women on state TANF policy with full attention to the potential complexities and contingencies of race and ethnicity, we develop, test, and compare two models of state policy adoption. The first, “single-axis” (Crenshaw 1989) model simply gauges the relationship between state TANF policy (as the dependent variable) and the presence and power of all women in the state legislature (as the primary independent variable), controlling for the presence and power of (all) Black and Latino legislators. The single-axis model, therefore, tests the basic proposition that

H1: The greater the incorporation (presence and power) of women in the state legislature, the more generous, accessible, flexible, and lenient the state welfare policy.

The second, “intersectional” model gauges the impact of the size and power of three different potential legislative coalitions, each identified in terms of gender *and* race/ethnicity: women of color, other “white” women, and men of color. This intersectional model allows us to test our hypothesis that

H2: The (liberal) impact of legislative women of color on state TANF policy will be greater than that of other women and greater than that of men of color. OR Legislative women of color are more effective advocates for poor women than are other women or men of color.

To test these hypotheses, we collected data for all 50 states, starting (when possible) with 1996, the last year in which AFDC was in effect, and ending (when possible) with 2007. Our

primary unit of analysis, therefore, is the state-year. For reasons explained below, we focus on the states' initial (pre-1999) reactions to the PRWORA mandate. The following sections provide detailed descriptions of and explanations for our variables and statistical models. Data sources and descriptive statistics for all measures can be found in the Appendix (Tables A1 through A3).

Dependent Variables

We gauge the impact of legislative women on multiple dimensions of state TANF policy, including those frequently examined in the existing literature as well as those particularly relevant to the gendered norms, stereotypes, assumptions, and political dynamics discussed above. Together, our dependent variables capture many of the most salient, controversial, and consequential components of TANF policy (Soss et al. 2001, 380). They each represent a set of choices made available to the states by the PRWORA; thus, they are all subject to the discretion of state policymakers. In short, these are the dimensions of TANF policy that are most likely shaped by state-level political, economic, and social forces—including gender, race, and class.

Almost every study of state AFDC and/or TANF policy has focused (at least in part) on the generosity of the cash assistance states provide to families on welfare. Prior to the wave of state-initiated welfare reform “experiments” encouraged and approved by the Bush and Clinton administrations in the early 1990s (Fording 2003), this was one of the few areas of AFDC in which state policymakers had discretion (Plotnick and Winters 1985; Preuhs 2006). Under TANF, state lawmakers still have the ability to adjust cash benefit levels upwards, downwards, or not at all. To build upon this long-standing interest in the monetary generosity of state welfare policy, our first dependent variable gauges the level of *cash benefits* provided in each state-year. It is operationalized as the dollar value of the TANF benefit for a family of three, adjusted for the

state-level annual cost of living (Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2000). Our expectation is that the real value of TANF cash benefits will be higher in states where legislative women—especially women of color—are more numerous and powerful.

Most of our analysis focuses on “the rules and penalties that condition access to resources and structure the treatment citizens receive in government programs” (Soss et al. 2001, 379). In the case of TANF, these rules and regulations are the heart of welfare reform as embodied in the 1996 PRWORA legislation (and subsequent re-authorization), for they are the tools with which policymakers attempt to modify the behavior of poor people so that they take more “personal responsibility” for themselves and their children (Allard 2007; Mettler 2000; Soss et al. 2001). In exercising discretion over these welfare rules, state policymakers choose just how tough (or paternalistic) they want to be. In their rules governing eligibility, for example, states can restrict or expand access to TANF benefits; and in their rules governing work requirements, states can increase or decrease the obligations TANF recipients must fulfill (Mettler 2000). In short, these welfare rules determine who qualifies as both “needy” and “responsible.”

We therefore follow the lead of Fellowes and Rowe (2004) and construct two broad indices of state welfare rules, one capturing how restrictively the states define initial and continued *eligibility* for TANF benefits and the other capturing how *flexibly* states impose work requirements upon TANF clients. We replicated the Fellowes and Rowe (2004) indices as closely as possible, identifying and coding the same 28 eligibility rules and the same 12 rules governing compliance with work requirements.¹⁴ All rules were coded as more or less

¹⁴ We could not replicate Fellowes and Rowe’s indices completely, due perhaps to changes made in the Welfare Rules Database in the intervening years, but we followed their guidelines as closely as possible. Information needed to code several work requirement rules in 1996-1998 was unavailable in the WRD. Thus our own flexibility index scores are available only for 1999-2007. Our measures are highly correlated with those of Fellowes and Rowe ($r=.87$ for the

restrictive/flexible according to the information available in the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database (WRD) (<http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/WRDWelcome.cfm>, accessed September-October 2009).

The 28 eligibility rules specify “the type and number of people that the state will support with welfare” and for how long (Fellowes and Rowe 2004, 365). They determine who can receive TANF benefits (e.g., childless pregnant women, minor heads of households, immigrants), how long they can continue receiving benefits over their lifetime (e.g., less than the five-year federal maximum or not), and who can receive an exemption from or extension of that time limit (e.g., recipients who are working or caring for a young child). For each of the 28 rules, each state in each year is assigned a 1 if the more restrictive option is in place and a 0 if the more lenient option is in place. In a few (seemingly random) state-years, the Welfare Rules Database did not have adequate information to determine which option was chosen. To avoid excluding a state-year from the index altogether, we calculated each state-year score as a ratio: the total number of restrictive eligibility rules divided by the total number of non-missing eligibility rules available. Higher scores represent more restrictive eligibility policies. Our expectation is that TANF eligibility rules will be less restrictive (and the eligibility index score will be lower) in states where legislative women—especially women of color—are more numerous and powerful.

The 12 rules that constitute the flexibility index include various provisions that exempt recipients from work requirements (e.g., to care for an ill or incapacitated family member),

eligibility index; $r=.85$ for the flexibility index), in the years in which our data overlap (1997-1999 for the eligibility index; 1999 for the flexibility index). The Cronbach Alpha scores for our indices (.59 for the eligibility index; .67 for the flexibility index) are not quite as high as those of Fellowes and Rowe (.78 and .76, respectively), but still strong. Thus, we are confident that our measures are as valid, reliable, and internally consistent as Fellowes and Rowe's. We thank Fellowes and Rowe for making their 1997-99 index scores available. More detailed information regarding our coding decisions for these indices is available upon request.

expand the definition of allowable, work-related activities (e.g., to include post-secondary education), reduce the number of work hours required (e.g., less than the federal requirement), and sanction noncompliance. Each state-year is assigned a 1 if the more flexible option is in place and a 0 if the more rigid option is in place. Again, to accommodate missing data, index scores are ratios: the total number of flexible work-related rules divided by the total number of non-missing rules available. Higher scores represent more flexible approaches to work requirements. Our expectation is that TANF rules governing work-related activity will be more flexible (and the flexibility index score will be higher) in states where legislative women—especially women of color—are more numerous and powerful.

Our next set of dependent variables focuses more narrowly on TANF rules that may be particularly salient to women as welfare recipients, voters, activists, and lawmakers. The first measure indicates whether a state has a *family cap* provision or not (as documented in the Welfare Rules Database). States that adopt the so-called “family cap” rule limit the incremental increase in benefits when an additional child is born to a mother receiving aid. One of the most well-known and controversial welfare reforms of the 1990s, family caps address many of the concerns surrounding “welfare queens” who allegedly have more children in order to maximize and fully exploit their “government handouts.” Feminist scholars in particular have criticized such policies as racialized violations of poor women’s reproductive rights (e.g., Roberts 1997; Smith 2007). Our expectation, therefore, is that family caps will be less prevalent in states where legislative women—especially women of color—are more numerous and powerful.

Another dimension of the PRWORA that may be particularly salient to women is the Family Violence Option (FVO), which permits states to temporarily waive time limits and other

program requirements for survivors of domestic violence.¹⁵ Our final dependent variable, then, indicates whether a state grants time limit extensions or exemptions for TANF recipients fleeing from or receiving treatment for domestic violence or abuse (according to the WRD). The FVO may very well have been inspired by the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which “initiated a nationally coordinated effort to study the problem of domestic violence”—including its relationship to poverty and welfare (Josephson 2002, 9). In the context of the VAWA, domestic violence was clearly a “women’s issue,” both in terms of the “clear and unequivocal” bipartisan support it received from women in Congress and in terms of how congresswomen chose to frame the issue (Hawkesworth et al. 2001, 19). As Hawkesworth et al. (2001) argue, it was the leadership of women in Congress and their strategy of framing domestic violence as a women’s issue (in the wake of the 1992 Year of the Woman elections) that ensured passage of the VAWA.

Nonetheless, initial uncertainty about how the FVO would be implemented in the states (and with what consequences) may have made even the most liberal, pro-women state legislators hesitate. Indeed, according to the Welfare Rules Database, 12 of the 34 states that made available a time limit waiver for domestic violence survivors under AFDC in 1996, declined to adopt one under TANF in 1997. Advocates for the poor and battered women alike recognized the potential problems. Battered women’s advocates (even some of those who helped draft the FVO

¹⁵ In addition to waiving time limits, the FVO also allows states to waive family caps and other program requirements regarding work/job training, residency, paternity establishment and child support cooperation for domestic violence survivors (PWRORA 42 U.S.C. section 608(a)(7)(A); Josephson 2002, 8; Graham 2001-2002, 453-54). We analyze state adoption of FVO time limit waivers only, for that is the only FVO waiver thoroughly documented in the Welfare Rules Database. According to Legal Momentum (formerly the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund), time limit waivers are the most common; among the 47 states that had adopted at least one type of FVO waiver (or the equivalent thereof) by 2004, only two (Arizona and Tennessee) declined to include a time limit waiver (Legal Momentum 2004).

provisions) worried that, without effective guidelines, state discretion in screening, identifying, and evaluating the needs of domestic violence survivors could do more harm than good: it could, for example, put such individuals in greater danger, invade their privacy, and jeopardize or reduce the assistance they would otherwise receive (Davies 1997; Raphael 1999). Given the long history of “raced-gendered” welfare politics, poor women of color and their advocates may have been even more wary of state implementation of domestic violence services (Crenshaw 1991; Josephson 2002).

Equally troubling was the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between the FVO waivers and the PRWORA’s “hardship” exception, which allows states to exempt up to 20 percent of their TANF clients from the federally mandated 60-month time limit (Davies 1997; Graham 2001-02, 451-54; Josephson 2002, 8-9; Mason 1998). If domestic violence survivors were counted as part of the 20 percent hardship quota, then, advocates worried, they might crowd out other, equally vulnerable (but seemingly less “deserving”) TANF recipients (Graham 2001-02, 454-55; Mason 1998, 634). The issue was not resolved until 1999, when the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ruled that FVO waivers would not be included in the “hardship” exception quota. This not only “eased...pressures among poor people’s advocates,” but also seemed to encourage more states to adopt the domestic violence time limit waiver (Graham 2001-02, 454-55; Josephson 2002, 8; Welfare Rules Database).

Given the uncertainties surrounding implementation of FVO waivers in the early years of TANF, our expectations regarding the impact of legislative women are also somewhat uncertain. At the very least, our standard hypothesis (H1) seems less likely. If female state legislators were aware of the potential problems, say through their ties to women’s advocacy networks, then they may have been more ambivalent (individually and collectively) about adopting FVO waivers

than they were about adopting other measures ostensibly designed to ease the restrictions and sanctions associated with TANF. In that case, we would not expect FVO waivers to be any more prevalent in states where legislative women are more numerous and powerful than in states where legislative women are less numerous and powerful. For reasons mentioned above, however, it may be that legislative women—and women of color especially—were even more wary of state implementation of FVO than their male colleagues, especially in the years before the implementation issues were resolved. In that case, we might expect to see, prior to 1999, a *negative* relationship between the incorporation of women—especially women of color—in the state legislature and the likelihood of state adoption of domestic violence waivers.

Although our data permit time-series cross-sectional analyses for each of these dependent variables, our own univariate analysis shows that modeling changes in state policy over the entire 12-year time period (1996-2007) is not always appropriate (see also Soss et al. 2006, 802-804). As the graphs in Figure 1 suggest, most of the changes made in state welfare policy occurred between 1996 and 1998. Calculating the yearly change within each state confirms that the aggregate trends shown in Figure 1 are not obscuring significant but countervailing state-level fluctuations. For example, in the two years between 1996 and 1998, states made 70 adjustments to their TANF eligibility rules (as measured by our eligibility restrictions index), for an average of 35 adjustments per year. Two-thirds of those adjustments (47 of the 70) involved more than one rule change. In contrast, in the nine years between 1998 and 2007, states made 108 adjustments in their eligibility rules, or an average of only 12 adjustments per year. Only 29 percent of those adjustments (31 out of 108) involved more than one rule change. Similarly, between 1997 and 1998, 17 out of the 47 states for which we have data made adjustments to their TANF work requirements (as indicated by Fellowes and Rowe's flexibility index); almost two-

thirds of those adjustments (11 out of 17) involved more than one rule change. In the eight years between 1999 and 2007, states made 52 adjustments to their work requirements, for an average of only 6.5 adjustments per year; and only 21 percent of those adjustments (11 out of 52) involved more than one rule change. Between 1996 and 1998, states made 9 adjustments to their family cap policy (8 adopted, 1 abolished) and 22 adjustments to their policy on domestic violence waivers (9 adopted, 13 abolished). Between 1998 and 2007, however, states made only two family cap adjustments (one adoption, one repeal) and 19 domestic violence adjustments (17 adoptions, 2 repeals). Cash benefit levels is the only dimension of state TANF policy that does not follow this trend. States made slightly more adjustments per year after 1998 than before (11.25 adjustments per year between 1998 and 2006; 7 adjustments per year between 1996 and 1998). Despite these policy adjustments, the real value of TANF benefits (adjusted for state-level cost of living), shown in Figure 1, declined steadily over the years as inflation took its toll.

Thus, with the exception of cash benefits, the trends in state welfare policy adoption suggest a sort of punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 1993): a flurry of state legislative activity immediately following the 1996 passage of the PRWORA, followed by a period of relative stability. It is in the states' initial reactions to the PRWORA, then, where the influence of legislative women may be most pronounced and most readily observed (Avery and Peffley 2005, 50). Accordingly, we employ cross-sectional analyses of all of our indicators of TANF policy as they existed in 1998, when the equilibrium likely began.¹⁶ And, while the PRWORA may have offered states the opportunity to re-evaluate their welfare policies

¹⁶ Preliminary pooled time-series analysis of cash benefit levels from 1997 to 2006 (an OLS regression model with panel-corrected standard errors and a lagged dependent variable), using a mixture of observed and imputed data for our primary independent variables, suggests that the legislative incorporation of women and minorities (in either the single-axis model or the intersectional model) made no difference.

altogether, we anticipate the possibility that states adopted a more incremental approach to the transition from AFDC to TANF (Preuhs 2007). Controlling for the 1996 status-quo of comparable AFDC policies, we gauge the ability of legislative women to effect more subtle shifts in state welfare policy toward less restrictive, more flexible, and more generous options (with the possible exception of time limit waivers for survivors of domestic violence).¹⁷

Independent Variables

To test our hypotheses regarding the relationships between state TANF policy and the legislative incorporation of women and women of color, our primary independent variables measure the size and institutional power of several identity-based coalitions in state legislatures. Given our existing knowledge of the significance of African Americans and Latinos as both welfare recipients and legislators, the lack of research on the relationship between other racial/ethnic minority groups and welfare politics in the U.S., plus the very small numbers of Asian American and Native American welfare recipients and state legislators (in every state except Hawaii), we focus our attention on the potentially distinctive impact of black and Latino legislators—male and female. Thus, for the single-axis models, we measure the *incorporation*, or the numerical presence and institutional power, of (all) female, (all) African American, and (all) Latino legislators in each state; for the intersectional models, we measure the incorporation of

¹⁷ Because data for our own flexibility index are available only for 1999-2007, we rely on Fellowes and Rowe's (2004) 1998 flexibility index scores for our cross-sectional analysis. Unfortunately, Fellowes and Rowe's data do not cover 1996 ADFC policy; thus, we are unable to control for the pre-TANF flexibility baseline. Fellowes and Rowe's flexibility index ranges from zero to 12, and is available for 47 states (2004, 366 and 371).

black and Latina women (“women of color”), all other (“white”) women, and black and Latino men (“men of color”).¹⁸

Each measure of group *incorporation* is a factor score derived from three component variables: (1) descriptive representation, or the percentage of legislative seats in both upper and lower chambers that are occupied by group members; (2) general institutional incorporation, or the average proportion of (weighted) leadership positions across the two chambers that are occupied by group members (Preuhs 2006); and (3) specific institutional incorporation, or the percentage of social/human services committees in both chambers that are chaired by group members (Preuhs 2006). For each group, the three component variables (especially the first two) are strongly related and load on the same factor. Thus, we are confident these factor scores effectively measure the single, uni-dimensional, underlying concept of political incorporation (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Preuhs 2007).¹⁹

To create each component variable, we first identified every female, African American, and/or Latino state legislator serving in 1997.²⁰ Then, we recorded what, if any leadership position each individual legislator held. All chamber, party, and committee leadership positions were recorded. We then aggregated the individual-level data by state to create measures of

¹⁸ We acknowledge the limitations and problems with the categories we have constructed, as well as the terms we use to describe them—not the least of which is the invisibility of Asian Americans and Native Americans in our analysis and discussion. We will explore other alternatives in future research, and welcome suggestions for doing so.

¹⁹ More detailed information regarding the factor analysis and the bivariate relationships between the component variables is available from the authors. We employ factor scores rather than the three component variables for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, the literature (discussed above) suggests that “sheer numbers” of group members, in and of themselves, are unlikely to have an impact on policy outputs, and that institutional power should matter as well. On a more practical level, our cross-sectional analysis (N=50 at most) provides very few degrees of freedom and leaves little room for disaggregating a set of highly correlated independent variables.

²⁰ All group incorporation variables (and the control variables) are lagged one year prior to the observed dependent variable.

descriptive representation, general institutional incorporation, and specific institutional incorporation for each group. Each component of the factor score is calculated as a percentage, with a potential range from zero to 100. Observed ranges, means, and standard deviations are reported in the Appendix (Table A1). Our measure of general institutional incorporation is modeled after Preuhs' (2006) and takes into account all formal leadership positions available in each state legislative chamber except lower-ranking party leadership positions. Chamber leaders are weighted most heavily, followed by top-ranking majority party leaders and fiscal policy committee chairs, then rules committee chairs, other committee chairs, and finally, the top-ranking minority party leaders.

Control Variables

Across all models, we control for the possible confounding influence of other state political, socioeconomic, and demographic pressures on welfare policymaking.²¹ The voluminous research examining the variation in state AFDC and TANF policy identifies a large number and wide variety of factors that shape state welfare policy. We cull from that literature the factors that are also likely to affect the level of legislative representation and incorporation enjoyed by women (overall) and women of color (specifically) in the states (Reingold, Bratton, and Haynie 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006).

As noted above, the racial and ethnic composition of the state population (and the state's welfare rolls) is key to understanding the dynamics of welfare policymaking within and across the states and is also key to understanding the election of African American and Latino men and women to state legislatures (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006; Preuhs 2007; Reingold, Bratton,

²¹ All control variables (except the time-invariant measure of state political culture) are observed in 1997, one year prior to the dependent variables.

and Haynie 2009; see also Lublin 1997). Our own preliminary, bivariate analysis shows that the racial/ethnic makeup of the state population is strongly correlated with every measure of group representation and incorporation we employ (including those for “white” women). It is imperative, therefore, that we control for the racial and ethnic composition of state populations (*percent Black and Latino*) in our models. Because the racial/ethnic composition of state populations is so very highly correlated with the racial and ethnic composition of state TANF caseloads ($r=.92$ for black population/caseload; $r=.90$ for Latino population/caseload), we are essentially controlling for both.

For similar reasons, we also control for the ideological leanings of state electorates (*citizen ideology*) and party control of the legislature (*Democratic control of legislature*).²² Numerous studies have shown that states with more liberal citizens tend to have more generous, open, and/or lenient welfare policies (Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Hero 1998; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Johnson 2003; Larimer 2005; Owens 2005; Plotnick and Winters 1990; Volden 2002) and more women in their legislatures (Arceneaux 2001; Hogan 2001; Norrander and Wilcox 1998, 2005; Sanbonmatsu 2002). Similarly, research indicates that the partisan makeup of state legislatures is associated with both welfare policy (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Larimer 2005; Plotnick and Winters 1985, 1990; Preuhs 2006, 2007) and women’s representation (Diamond 1977; Rule 1981, 1990; Sanbonmatsu 2002). Our own bivariate analysis indicates that Democratic control of the legislature is especially consequential for the institutional incorporation of women and racial/ethnic minorities, who are themselves disproportionately Democratic.

²² Controlling for partisan control of the state legislature necessarily excludes Nebraska, with its uniquely nonpartisan legislature, from our analysis.

Several measures of the statewide demand or perceived need for welfare reform and expenditures, as well as the state's capacity to meet those needs, have been shown to affect state welfare policy choices, including: per capita income, education level, the size of the welfare caseload, unemployment rate, and the "unmarried birth rate" (the proportion of births given by unmarried women) (Avery and Peffley 2005; Brown 1995; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Hero 1998; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Johnson 2003; Larimer 2005; Owens 2005; Plotnick and Winters 1985, 1990; Preuhs 2006, 2007; Soss, et al. 2001; Volden 2002). States and state legislative districts with higher levels of education are also more likely to elect women (Camobreco and Barnello 2003; Hogan 2001; Reingold, Bratton, and Haynie 2009). Plus, numerous studies have shown that women's descriptive representation is higher in states and more likely in districts with more women in the labor force and the professions (Arceneaux 2001; Hill 1981; Norrander & Wilcox 1998, 2005; Reingold, Bratton, and Haynie 2009; Rule 1981, 1990; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Welch 1978). Not surprisingly, our own bivariate analysis shows that various measures of women's legislative representation and incorporation are strongly correlated with general state-level socio-economic measures, including *per capita income*, education (*percent high school graduates*), *unemployment*, and the *unmarried birth rate*. We therefore control for all four indicators in our models.²³

Finally, several studies have investigated the possibility that welfare policy and policymaking in Southern states differs from that in other states—even controlling for racial demographics, ideology, and the size of the Democratic legislative caucus (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Brown 1995; Larimer 2005; Preuhs 2006, 2007; Soss et al. 2001).

²³ To preserve degrees of freedom in our cross-sectional (N=49 or 47) models, we eliminate per capita income from the equations. In preliminary analyses, income per capita failed to have a significant, independent effect on any of the dependent variables.

The findings have been mixed, however, leaving it unclear whether or how Southern politics shapes welfare policy. On the other hand, the literature on women's descriptive representation in state legislatures makes it clear that state political culture, like that of the conservative, "solid" South, does play a role (Arceneaux 2001; Camobreco and Barnello 2003; Diamond 1977; Hill 1981; Hogan 2001; Rule 1981, 1990; Sanbonmatsu 2002). "Traditionalistic" states (located primarily in the South) and "individualistic" states tend to have fewer women in their legislatures than states with "moralistic" political cultures, which value a government that actively promotes the public good and full democratic participation (Elazar 1984). Given their cultural affinity toward social welfare provision, moralistic states may also be more likely than other states to choose more generous and less restrictive TANF policy options. Thus, we include dichotomous indicator of *moralistic* state political culture²⁴ in our models of state TANF policy.²⁵

²⁴ Traditionalistic political culture was eliminated from the cross-sectional models after preliminary analyses indicated it did not have a significant, independent effect on any of the dependent variables.

²⁵ We do not control for additional factors known to influence state welfare policy, but unexamined (directly or indirectly) in the research on women's descriptive representation in the states, including: class bias in voter turnout (Avery and Peffley 2005; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; see also Johnson 2001, 2003; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995), Democratic governor (Preuhs 2007), and party competition in the legislature (Avery and Peffley 2005; Hero 1998; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Soss et al. 2001; see also Fording 2003). Our own bivariate analysis indicates that these variables are unrelated to the representation and incorporation of women in state legislatures. We also chose not to control for legislative professionalism, even though it is known to influence the election of women to state legislatures (Arceneaux 2001; Camobreco and Barnello 2003; Carroll 1994; Diamond 1977; Hogan 2001; Norrander and Wilcox 2005; Squire 1992). Very few studies have examined the impact of legislative professionalism on state welfare policy (Hero 1998; Volden 2002), and our own preliminary analyses indicate that it almost never has a significant independent effect on our measures of state TANF policies. Data for our measures of class bias in voter turnout, party competition, and legislative professionalism were obtained from Springer and Rigby (n.d.), the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, and Squire (2007), respectively. We thank Elizabeth Rigby and Richard Fording especially for making these data available.

Results

Single-Axis Model

We first assess whether the legislative incorporation of all women, regardless of race and ethnicity, can have an impact on states' initial decisions regarding TANF cash benefits, policies, and rules. The key independent variables in these single-axis models are our factor scores of the political incorporation of all women, all black, and all Latino legislators. We include these, along with a set of control variables, in the five cross-sectional models (N varies from 47 to 49) presented in Table 1. In model one, we regress the three single axis factor scores and confounding variables on the replication of Fellowes and Rowe's (2004) eligibility index. Although none of the single axis incorporation variables reaches standard significance levels, the female incorporation factor score is just slightly above ($p\text{-value} < 0.167$). Thus, the power and presence of women legislators may have a slight liberalizing effect on TANF eligibility policies. Model one also shows that states with more liberal citizens have set more lenient and permissive TANF eligibility standards.²⁶

Model two provides even less support for the single-axis hypothesis that women have a significant effect on state welfare policy; the presence and power of female legislators does not influence the degree to which states implement more flexible TANF work requirements. This model does suggest, however, that state legislatures with relatively high degrees of Latino incorporation adopt more flexible TANF regulations. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship by varying the values of the Latino incorporation factor score, while holding the other dichotomous

²⁶ To assess the robustness of our findings, we replaced our replicated eligibility measure with Fellowes and Rowe's (2004) original index. Doing so produced comparable results, especially with respect to the legislative incorporation factor scores.

and categorical variables at their medians and other continuous variables at their means.²⁷ As Latino incorporation increases, from two standard deviations below the mean to two standard deviations above, the predicted flexibility index score increases from 4.1 (CI = 1.8 to 6.6) to 9.8 (CI = 7.2 to 12.2). Additionally and consistent with existing literature, model two demonstrates that states with larger minority populations and more conservative electorates adopt less flexible TANF rules.

In model three, we estimate the impact of legislative women on the probability of states adopting a family cap policy. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the group incorporation variables achieves standard significance levels.²⁸ The presence and power of female, black, and Latino legislators does not appear to impact whether the states have implemented a family cap policy.²⁹ The only significant variable in model three is whether the state had a family cap in 1996, the pre-PWRORA implementation baseline.

Model four assesses the impact of the single-axis group incorporation scores on whether states permitted domestic violence time limit waivers in 1998. Unfortunately, this model does not pass the likelihood-ratio χ^2 test for minimum adequacy of fit (i.e., the combined coefficient estimates are not distinguishable from zero), so we are somewhat weary of drawing steadfast

²⁷ The remaining graphs of predicted values and probabilities follow this pattern of varying values of a certain independent variable while keeping the other dichotomous and categorical variables at their medians and other continuous variables at their means.

²⁸ Most of our cross-sectional models include the “baseline” value of the dependent variables in 1996 for each state, which is likely to produce more conservative estimates. We also ran the family cap model without the 1996 baseline and found, like Soss et al. (2001), that the larger a state’s black and Latino population, the more likely it is to have a family cap.

²⁹ We also attempted an ordered logistic regression with a family cap scale as the dependent variable. This scale indicates not only whether a state has a family cap provision, but also whether the state offers exemptions for (a) children conceived due to rape or incest; (b) “capped” children who move to another “child-only” unit; and (c) first births to minor parents. The results for the dichotomous family cap indicator were similar to those for the scale and therefore, we present only the former in the tables.

conclusions from it.³⁰ Nonetheless, the results indicate that, here again, the legislative incorporation of women has no discernible impact on state adoption of domestic violence time limit waivers. Instead, the incorporation of Latinos in state legislatures appears to be associated with a lower probability of adopting such waivers. Also surprising (given previous evidence of racial backlash) is the finding that states with larger black and Latino populations are more likely to grant domestic violence time limit waivers. Consistent with our expectations, we find that, in 1998, domestic violence time limit waivers are more common in states where Democrats control the legislature.

Next, our single-axis hypothesis is contradicted by model five. *Ceteris paribus*, female legislators' presence and power is associated with *lower* cash benefits during the early years of the TANF program. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship: as the factor score for women's incorporation increases from two standard deviations below the mean to two standard deviations above, the mean predicted cash benefit decreases from \$542 (CI = \$516 to \$568) to \$486 (CI = \$456 to \$517). Without accounting for racial and ethnic cleavages, we might conclude that, contrary to our hypothesis, states with more numerous and powerful female legislators were more likely than others to reduce cash benefits in the transition from AFDC to TANF. Our intersectional model will cast doubt on this conclusion. The control variables in model five indicate that cash benefit levels increase in states with a more liberal citizenry and a higher unmarried birth rate, but are largely a function of previous benefit levels.

Overall, the models in Table 1 provide lackluster and contradictory findings regarding the single-axis hypothesis. In only one instance— eligibility requirements—does the presence and

³⁰ We get very similar results when we model state domestic violence time limit waivers in 1997 (rather than 1998); however, in this case, the model does pass the goodness of fit test (likelihood-ratio $\chi^2 = 22.84$; $p=.0186$).

power of (all) women legislators even come close to having a significant liberalizing effect on TANF policy. In other areas, such as the initial adjustment from AFDC to TANF cash benefits, female legislative incorporation may have the reverse effect. For the remaining TANF policies, however, legislative women seem to have no significant impact at all.

Intersectional Model

In contrast to the single axis model, the intersectional model distinguishes the potential impact of women of color from that of other women and from that of men of color, on the same set of state TANF policies. As above, we discuss the results of a series of cross-sectional models (presented in Table 2). The key independent variables for the intersectional model are factor scores of the legislative incorporation of women of color, other “white” women, and men of color. We include these factor scores along with a series of control variables that account for confounding influences.³¹

Model six considers how well the intersectional model characterizes the relationship between gender, race/ethnicity, legislative incorporation, and state-to-state variation in TANF eligibility policies. From this model, it appears that women of color may have a more pronounced (liberal) impact on the eligibility index than other legislative women and men of color have. Figure 4 shows that as the legislative incorporation of women of color increases (from -2 SDs to +2 SDs), the predicted eligibility index goes from 0.64 (CI = 0.54 to 0.74) to 0.47 (CI = 0.37 to 0.58). States where legislative women of color are present and powerful have more lenient eligibility requirements. The impact of other legislative women is in the same direction, but noticeably weaker; the regression coefficient on the factor score for “white”

³¹ In order to streamline this section, the control variables will not be discussed unless their impact differs significantly from what was presented in the single-axis models.

women is just slightly above standard significance levels (i.e., $p\text{-value} < 0.114$).³² However, a Wald test reveals that the effect of women of color is not statistically different from that of “white” women.³³ As was the case with the family cap policy and cash benefits, model 6 also reveals that state lawmakers did not ignore previous rules and regulations under AFDC (in 1996) when they set TANF eligibility policy in 1998.

In model 7, we find that the legislative incorporation of both women and men of color impacts the flexibility index. The effect of women of color is no different from that of men of color (Wald F-test statistic = 0.02, $p\text{-value} < 0.8961$), while the impact of women of color may be slightly different from that of other legislative women (Wald F-test statistic = 2.71, $p\text{-value} < 0.1083$). Figures 5 and 6, respectively, show that as the presence and power of women of color and men of color in the state legislature increases, so too does the flexibility of TANF work requirements. In contrast to the single axis model, which indicated that legislative women have no influence over the flexibility of TANF work requirements, the intersectional model shows that *some* legislative women (and some of their male colleagues) can and do have an impact.

Unfortunately, the intersectional framework is no more helpful than the single-axis model in explaining state-level variation in the family cap (see model 8). The legislative incorporation of women of color (as well as other women and men of color) does not influence whether a state has a family cap policy. Since some states implemented family caps in the early to mid 1990s through waivers to the AFDC program, our data, which focus on welfare policy changes that

³² Further analysis disaggregating the effects of “white” Democratic women’s incorporation from that of “white” Republican women’s incorporation suggests it is the latter that accounts for the bulk of the overall effect of “white” women on TANF eligibility rules. Although the two coefficients are quite different in magnitude (-0.008 and -0.038, respectively), the difference is not statistically significant (χ^2 statistic = 0.66, $p\text{-value} < 0.4229$).

³³ A separate Wald test shows that the impact of black female and Latina legislators is not statistically different from that of men of color.

occurred between 1996 and 1998, may not allow for a full investigation of the impact of female legislators on family cap decisions. Indeed, across the single-axis and intersectional models, the most consistent and strongest predictor of family caps in 1998 is whether the state had a family cap policy in 1996.

The results of model 9 confirm our suspicion that, given the uncertainty surrounding the implementation of domestic violence waivers in the early years of TANF, women of color may have been particularly reluctant to entrust such initiatives to the states. Thus, contrary to our general expectations, the presence and power of women of color (in model 9) is negatively associated with having domestic violence time limit waivers in 1998. Equivalence tests show that the coefficient for women of color is significantly different from that of other legislative women (χ^2 statistic = 4.84, p-value < 0.0279), while the impact of women of color is not statistically different from that of men of color (χ^2 statistic = 1.00, p-value < 0.3177).³⁴ Figure 7 illustrates that as the women of color factor score increases from one standard deviation below the mean to two above, the predicted likelihood of having domestic violence time limit waivers decreases from 0.91 (CI = 0.54 to 1) to 0.14 (CI = 0 to 0.63).

Interestingly, in model 10, women of color and “white” women seem to have opposite effects on the initial adjustment from AFDC to TANF cash benefits; benefits seem to increase when women of color are present and powerful, and decrease when “white” women are more fully incorporated. The coefficients for the two factor scores are of nearly equal magnitude (-15.762 for “white” women; 15.164 for women of color), but in opposite directions. The coefficient on black and Latina women’s factor score is just slightly above standard significance

³⁴ As with model 4, model 9 does not pass a likelihood-ratio χ^2 test for minimum adequacy of fit. Again, we obtain very similar results when we model the presence of domestic violence time limit waivers in 1997; and the 1997 model does pass the goodness of fit test (likelihood-ratio χ^2 = 23.98; p-value < 0.0128).

levels (p-value < 0.127), but significantly different from that of other women (Wald F-test statistic = 7.82, p-value < 0.0081).³⁵ If we were to consider the single-axis model exclusively, we might conclude that all women are having a negative effect on cash benefits. However, our intersectional model demonstrates that only “white” women’s incorporation is negatively associated with cash benefits. This nuanced yet powerful finding is illustrated in Figures 8 and 9. As the factor score for “white” women’s incorporation goes from two standard deviations below to two above the mean, the predicted cash benefit decreases from \$548 (CI = \$521 to \$572) to \$480 (CI = \$447 to \$513). In contrast, as the presence and power of women of color increases from two standard deviations below the mean to two above, the predicted cash benefit increases from \$488 (CI = \$453 to \$522) to \$539 (CI = \$503 to \$576). Also in model 10, and consistent with extant research (Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Preuhs 2006, 2007), the percentage of the state population that is black and Latino is negatively associated with the amount of cash benefits.

In sum, our intersectional analyses (in Table 2) indicate that in the formative years of welfare policymaking, legislative women of color did play a distinct role. Our results also demonstrate that the single-axis model may sometimes obscure the impact of race and gender as they interact to affect state politics and policymaking. The various relationships between race,

³⁵ Further analysis suggests that it is “white” Republican women, for the most part, who are exerting this negative influence on TANF cash benefits. We ran the same model, disaggregating the legislative incorporation factor score for “white” women into two separate factor scores for incorporation of “white” Democratic and “white” Republican women. In this disaggregated model, the coefficient for “white” Democratic women is -7.873 (SE=8.256); the coefficient for “white” Republican women is -20.784 (SE=7.862). The coefficient for women of color (almost all of whom are Democrats) remains much the same: 15.464 (SE=9.673). Equivalence tests show that, while the difference in the coefficients for “white” Democratic and Republican women is not statistically significant (χ^2 statistic = 1.07, p-value < 0.3084), the difference between the coefficients for “white” Democratic women and women of color (χ^2 statistic = 3.10, p-value < 0.0870) and the coefficients for “white” Republican women and women of color (χ^2 statistic = 9.22, p-value < 0.0044) are. Thus, we are assured that the impact of women of color is truly distinct.

gender, political incorporation, and welfare policies presented here are much more complex and contingent than any single-axis model can capture.

Conclusions

At first glance, looking through a “single-axis” lens, it may seem as if state legislative women failed to move TANF policy in a more liberal, woman-friendly direction, even in the early years of policy disequilibrium. At best, they may have managed to relax the eligibility criteria a bit; at worst, they may have had a hand in reducing cash benefit levels. But on most policy dimensions examined here, the presence and power of (all) women in state legislatures seems to have made very little difference.

The picture looks quite different, however, when viewed through an intersectional lens. Taking into account the intersecting gender and racial identities of state legislators highlights both the contingent effects of gender politics and the pivotal role of women of color. In some instances, our analysis suggests that legislative women of all racial and ethnic backgrounds made a difference in state TANF policy. Eligibility restrictions were eased somewhat in states where legislative women of color and “white” women were more numerous and powerful. In other instances, legislative women of color seem to have acted on their own or at least, without their “white” female counterparts. It was the presence and power of women of color, along with that of men of color, that pushed some states to adopt more flexible work requirements; not that of other women. At the same time, the presence and power of women of color (alone) made some states more reluctant to grant time limit waivers to victims of domestic violence. Given the uncertainties surrounding state implementation of the Family Violence Option prior to 1999, legislative women of color may have been most wary of the unintended but potentially harmful

consequences of this seemingly liberal, women-friendly policy option. In yet another instance, legislative women of color and other women appear to have worked at cross-purposes. As our analysis indicates, the presence and power of “white” women in the legislature is associated with a decrease in cash benefits, while the presence and power of women of color is associated with an increase in cash benefits. Across all these divergent patterns, however, one trend is clear: the legislative incorporation of women of color mattered most, suggesting they were indeed the most effective advocates for poor women in the era of welfare reform.

As our results imply, the impact of women on TANF policy is not consistent or straightforward. It depends a great deal on which women and which policies one examines. Nonetheless, it is quite remarkable that women—especially women of color—had any effect whatsoever on state TANF policy. Women were a minority of legislators in every state-year examined here, and vastly outnumbered in most. They claimed only a fraction of institutional power and authority, even under the best of circumstances. Women of color, of course, enjoyed fewer resources still. During the transition from AFDC to TANF (1996-98), Black women and Latinas never claimed more than ten percent of the votes and held top leadership positions in *very* few states. Likewise, they rarely chaired social service committees. State welfare policy itself, as we have seen, proved resistant to non-incremental change—even during a period of policy disequilibrium, when states were handed a federal mandate of reform. Overcoming inertia and pushing against the popular mandate of get-tough welfare reform was a tall order, indeed. Yet, legislative women of color, who arguably faced the greatest obstacles, somehow managed to make a difference.

Our findings raise many questions worth investigating in future research. First, how do (some) women manage to make a difference? What, in other words, are the causal mechanisms

connecting women's legislative incorporation to policy outputs? Are the women themselves effecting change in welfare policy, or is it the effect their presence and power has on their colleagues? Or both? Could the impact of legislative women of color, for example, be attributed to their ability to build coalitions with other like-minded legislators across racial, ethnic, and/or gender lines (Fraga et al. 2008)? Addressing these questions could help us better understand how the descriptive representation and substantive representation of marginalized groups are linked. It could also shed more light on the puzzling cases in which legislative women—women of color and “white” women alike—appear to have a conservative effect on TANF policy. It may be that what looks women-friendly at the federal policy design stage does not look so women-friendly at the state implementation stage, as we have argued in the case of domestic violence waivers. Or perhaps there simply are some aspects of welfare policy in which legislative women are more likely to advocate a get-tough approach (and succeed). Equally plausible, though, is the potential for backlash against women in state legislatures, particularly when they threaten to use their power and influence (Hawkesworth 2003; Kathlene 1994). All of these possibilities merit further investigation.

The possibility that women (especially “white” women) had a liberal effect on some dimensions of TANF policy and a conservative effect on others raises another intriguing question. Are legislative women making trade-offs? In the context of scarce public resources, a limited supply of political capital, and the risk of backlash, legislative women may be choosing their battles carefully, electing to make a difference on one front at the expense of another. Hero and Preuhs (2007) suggest that such trade-offs within TANF policy are entirely likely. According to their analysis, expanding immigrant eligibility reduces the level of cash benefits in the states. This trade-off between eligibility restrictions and cash benefits may help explain the divergent

effects of “white” women’s incorporation observed here. Intentionally or not, their efforts to ease eligibility restrictions may have resulted in a reduction of cash benefits.

The diverging effects of women of color and other legislative women certainly warrant further investigation. Why, or under what circumstances, do different women have different effects? Do they have different preferences and priorities? Are they serving different constituencies? Is one group better able than the other to act on its agenda and realize its goal? Does the incorporation of one group have different effects on colleagues than that of the other? Is one group more susceptible to backlash while the other is the more attractive coalition partner? We might also investigate instances in which different legislative women have similar effects on policy. Are they coming together and coordinating their efforts? Or are they simply on parallel tracks, moving in the same direction but with little or no cooperation or interaction among them? Clearly more research is needed to explore how intersectionality affects the behavior and accomplishments of legislative women.

Even our “null” findings are worth further investigation. Why did women fail to have any impact on family cap provisions, for example? Was it for lack of trying, or did women—especially women of color—confront the same sort of “racing-gendering” experienced by women of color in Congress (Hawkesworth 2003)? Perhaps we are simply looking in the wrong place at the wrong time. States began experimenting with family cap provisions—and many of the other pillars of welfare reform—years before PRWORA. Legislative women may have had their say much earlier than 1996.

Indeed, looking backwards and forwards across time, we wonder what implications our research on TANF policy has for future policymaking efforts. Can legislative women make a difference in, or even help bring about a new era of social welfare policy? If welfare reform of

the 1990s was the golden opportunity for women's representation (as the 1992 "Year of the Woman" and the concept of policy disequilibrium might suggest), then our findings are not encouraging. But for various reasons discussed above, we believe the years following the PWRORA's passage were far from golden. Given the obstacles faced by legislative women in the TANF years, and the evidence that they nevertheless had some influence over some outcomes, our research suggests that future trends might be more encouraging. If, as some have speculated (Levin-Epstein and Gorzelany 2008; Smith 2010), popular and elite support for get-tough welfare reform is waning, and voters and policymakers are growing more concerned with alleviating poverty than with reducing welfare rolls, then legislative women may find many opportunities to make a difference. Yet our research also suggests that much will depend on current and future dynamics of race, gender, and class politics—and the intersections therein. Future efforts and future research might focus in particular on women of color as both the leaders and beneficiaries of such change. Much may depend on whether the face of poverty remains the demonized welfare queen of color as well as the presence and power of legislative women of color.

References

- Abramovitz, Mimi. 1996. *Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present*, revised edition. Boston, MA: South End Press.
- Allard, Scott W. 2007. "The Changing Face of Welfare during the Bush Administration." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 37(3): 304-32.
- Arceneaux, Kevin. 2001. "The 'Gender Gap' in State Legislative Representation: New Data to Tackle an Old Question." *Political Research Quarterly* 54(1): 143-160.
- Avery, James M., and Mark Peffley. 2005. "Voter Registration Requirements, Voter Turnout, and Welfare Eligibility Policy: Class Bias Matters." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 5(1): 47-67.
- Barrilleaux, Charles, Thomas Holbrook, and Laura Langer. 2002. "Electoral Competition, Legislative Balance, and American State Welfare Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(2): 415-27.
- Baumgartner, Frank and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Beckwith, Karen, and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers. 2007. "Sheer Numbers: Critical Representation Thresholds and Women's Political Representation." *Perspectives on Politics* 5 (3):553-65.
- Berkman, Michael B., and Robert E. O'Connor. 1993. "Do Women Legislators Matter?" *American Politics Research* 21(1):102-24.
- Berry, William D., Richard C. Fording, Russell L. Hanson. 2000. "An Annual Cost of Living Index for the American States, 1960-1995." *The Journal of Politics* 62(2): 550-567.
- Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson. 1998. "Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 327-48.
- Brown, Robert D. 1995. "Party Cleavages and Welfare Effort in the American States." *American Political Science Review* 89(1): 23-33.
- Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. 1984. *Protest is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Burrell, Barbara. 1994. *A Woman's Place Is in the House: Campaigning for Congress in the Feminist Era*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Bratton, Kathleen A. 2002. "The Effect of Legislative Diversity on Agenda Setting: Evidence

- from Six State Legislatures.” *American Politics Research* 30: 115-42.
- Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. “Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race.” *Journal of Politics* 61: 658-79.
- Bratton, Kathleen A., Kerry L. Haynie, and Beth Reingold. 2006. “Agenda Setting and African American Women in State Legislatures.” *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 28: 71-96
- Cammisa, Anne Marie, and Beth Reingold. 2004. "Women in State Legislatures and State Legislative Research: Beyond Sameness and Difference." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 4(2): 181-210.
- Camobreco, John F., and Michelle A. Barnello. 2003. “Postmaterialism and Post-Industrialism: Cultural Influences on Female Representation in State Legislatures.” *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 3(2): 117-138.
- Carroll, Susan J. 1994. *Women as Candidates in American Politics*, 2nd edition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Carroll, Susan J. 2001. “Representing Women: Women State Legislators as Agents of Policy-Related Change.” In *The Impact of Women in Public Office*, ed. Susan J. Carroll. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP). 1996. “Women in State Legislatures 1996.” National Information Bank on Women in Public Office, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/resources/FactSheetArchive.php (accessed 19 May 2010)
- Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP). 1997. “The Gender Gap: Attitudes on Public Policy Issues.” National Information Bank on Women in Public Office, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/research/topics/voting_behavior.php (accessed 26 October 2009)
- Chaney, Carole K., R. Michael Alvarez, and Jonathan Nagler. 1998. “Explaining the Gender Gap in the U.S. Presidential Elections, 1980-1992.” *Political Research Quarterly* 51(2): 311-40.
- Christopher, Karen, Paula England, Timothy M. Smeeding, and Katherin Ross Phillips. 2002. “The Gender Gap in Poverty in Modern Nations: Single Motherhood, the Market, and the State.” *Sociological Perspectives* 45(3): 219-42.
- Clark, Cal, and Janet Clark. 1999. “The Gender Gap in 1996: More Meaning Than a ‘Revenge of the Soccer Moms.’” In *Women in Politics: Outsiders or Insiders?* 3rd edition, ed. Lois Duke Whitaker. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

- Clark, Cal, and Janet Clark. 2006. "The Gender Gap in the Early 21st Century: Volatility from Security Concerns." In *Women in Politics: Outsiders or Insiders?* 4th edition, ed. Lois Duke Whitaker. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Clark, Cal, and Janet M. Clark. 2008. "The Reemergence of the Gender Gap in 2004." In *Voting the Gender Gap*, ed. Lois Duke Whitaker. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 2000. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*, 2nd edition. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Cook, Elizabeth Adell, and Clyde Wilcox. 1991. "Feminism and the Gender Gap—A Second Look." *Journal of Politics* 53(4): 1111-22.
- Cowell-Meyers, Kimberly, and Laura Langbein. 2009. "Linking Women's Descriptive and Substantive Representation in the American States." Paper presented at the annual State Politics and Policy Conference, Chapel Hill, NC. Forthcoming in *Politics & Gender*.
- Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1989. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics." *The University of Chicago Legal Forum* 139 (1989): 139-167.
- Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1991. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color." *Stanford Law Review* 43: 1241-99.
- Crowley, Jocelyn Elise. 2004. "When Tokens Matter." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29: 109-136.
- Darling, Marsha J. 1998. "African American Women in State Elective Office in the South." In *Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Davies, Jill. 1997. "The New Welfare Law: State Implementation and Use of the Family Violence Option." National Resource Center on Domestic Violence and the National Network to End Domestic Violence. Available at: http://new.vawnet.org/category/index_pages.php?category_id=190 (last accessed 20 May 2010).
- Diamond, Irene. 1977. *Sex Roles in the State House*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dodson, Debra L. 2006. *The Impact of Women in Congress*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Dodson, Debra L., and Susan J. Carroll. 1991. *Reshaping the Agenda: Women in State Legislatures*. New Brunswick, NJ: Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers.

- Dyck, Joshua J., and Laura S. Hussey. 2008. "The End of Welfare as We Know It? Durable Attitudes in a Changing Information Environment." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72(4): 589-618.
- Elazar, Daniel J. 1984. *American Federalism: A View from the States*, 3rd edition. New York: Harper & Row.
- Epstein, Michael J., Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell. 2005. "Do Women and Men State Legislators Differ?" In *Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future*, 2nd edition, eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fellowes, Matthew C., and Gretchen Rowe. 2004. "Politics and the New American Welfare State." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 362-73.
- Fineman, Martha Albertson. 1996. "The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare 'Reform.'" *Santa Clara Law Review* 36: 287-311.
- Fording, Richard C. 2003. "'Laboratories of Democracy' or Symbolic Politics? The Racial Origins of Welfare Reform." In *Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform*, eds. Sanford F. Schram, Joe Soss, and Richard C. Fording. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Foster, Carly Hayden. 2008. "The Welfare Queen: Race, Gender, Class and Public Opinion." *Race, Gender & Class* 15(3/4): 162-79.
- Fox, Cybelle. 2004. "The Changing Color of Welfare? How Whites' Attitudes toward Latinos Influence Support for Welfare." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(3): 580-625.
- Fraga, Lius Ricardo, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, Linda Lopez, and Ricardo Ramírez. 2008. "Representing Gender and Ethnicity: Strategic Intersectionality." In *Legislative Women: Getting Elected, Getting Ahead*, ed. Beth Reingold. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Fraser, Nancy, and Linda Gordon. 1994. "A Genealogy of *Dependency*: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State." *Signs* 19: 309-36.
- Gilens, Martin. 1999. *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gordon, Linda. 1994. *Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935*. New York: Free Press.
- Graham, Mark Matthew. 2001-2002. "Domestic Violence and Welfare 'Reform': The Family Violence Option in Illinois." *Journal of Gender, Race, and Justice* 5: 433-486.
- Hancock, Ange-Marie. 2004. *The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen*.

- New York: New York University Press.
- Hancock, Ange-Marie. 2007. "When Multiplication Doesn't Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm." *Perspectives on Politics* 5: 63-79.
- Hawkesworth, Mary. 2003. "Congressional Enactments of Race–Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced–Gendered Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 97: 529-550.
- Hawkesworth, Mary, Kathleen J. Casey, Krista Jenkins, and Katherine E. Kleeman. 2001. "Legislating By and For Women: A Comparison of the 103rd and 104th Congresses." Center for Women and Politics (CAWP), Rutgers University
<http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/research/topics/documents/CongReport103-104.pdf>
- Hero, Rodney E. 1998. *Faces of Inequality: Social Diversity in American Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hero, Rodney E., and Robert R. Preuhs. 2007. "Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 498-517.
- Hill, David B. 1981. "Political Culture and Female Political Representation." *Journal of Politics* 43 (February): 159-68.
- Hill, Kim Quaile, Jan E. Leighley, and Angela Hinton-Andersson. 1995. "Lower-Class Mobilization and Policy Linkage in the U.S. States." *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 75-86.
- Hogan, Robert E. 2001. "The Influence of State and District Conditions on the Representation of Women in U.S. State Legislatures." *American Politics Research* 29(4): 4-24.
- Johnson, Martin. 2001. "The Impact of Social Diversity and Racial Attitudes on Social Welfare Policy." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 1(1): 27-49.
- Johnson, Martin. 2003. "Racial Context, Public Attitudes, and Welfare effort in the American States." In *Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform*, ed. Sanford F. Schram, Joe Soss, and Richard C. Fording. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Jones, Bradford S. and Regina P. Branton. 2006. "Beyond Logit and Probit: Cox Duration Models for State Policy Adoption." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*. 5(4): 420-433.
- Josephson, Jyl J. 2002. "The Intersectionality of Domestic Violence and Welfare in the Lives of Poor Women." *Journal of Poverty* 6(1): 1-20.
- Kathlene, Lyn. 1994. "Power and Influence in State Legislative Policy-Making: The Interaction of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates." *American Political Science Review* 88: 560-76.

- Kaufmann, Karen M., and John R. Petrocik. 1999. "The Changing Politics of American Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(3): 864-87.
- Keiser, Lael. 1997. "The Influence of Women's Political Power on Bureaucratic Output: The Case of Child Support Enforcement." *British Journal of Political Science* 27(1): 136-148.
- King-Meadow, Tyson and Thomas F. Schaller. 2006. *Devolution and Black State Legislators: Challenges and Choices in the Twenty-first Century*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Larimer, Christopher W. 2005. "The Impact of Multimember State Legislative Districts on Welfare Policy." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 5(3): 265-82.
- Legal Momentum. 2004. "Family Violence Option: State By State Summary." Washington, DC. Available at: http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/www6-6_appendix_d_family_violence_option.pdf (last accessed 20 May 2010).
- Levin-Epstein, Jodie, and Kristen Michelle Gorzelany. 2008. *Seizing the Moment: State Governments and the New Commitment to Reduce Poverty in America*. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy.
- Lubiano, Wahneema. 1992. "Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels: Ideological War by Narrative Means." In *Race-ing Justice, En-Gendering Power*, ed. Toni Morrison. New York: Pantheon.
- Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mason, Jennifer M. 1998. "Buying Time for Survivors of Domestic Violence: A Proposal for Implementing an Exception to Welfare Time Limits." *New York University Law Review* 73: 621-666.
- McLanahan, Sara and Erin Kelly. 2001. "The Feminization of Poverty: Past and Future." in *Handbook of the Sociology of Gender*. J. Chafetz (Ed.), 127-145. New York: Plenum Publishing Corp.
- Mead, Lawrence M., ed. 1997. *The New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Mettler, Suzanne. 2000. "States' Rights, Women's Obligations: Contemporary Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective." *Women and Politics*, 21, 1-34.
- Mink, Gwendolyn. 1995. *The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Mink, Gwendolyn. 1998. *Welfare's End*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox. 1998. "The Geography of Gender Power: Women in State Legislatures." In *Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox. 2005. "Change and Continuity in the Geography of Women State Legislators." In *Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future*, 2nd edition, ed. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press.
- O'Brien, Erin. 2004. "The Double-Edged Sword of Women's Organizing: Poverty and the Emergence of Racial and Class Differences in Women's Policy Priorities." *Women & Politics* 26(3): 25-56.
- Owens, Chris T. 2005. "Black Substantive Representation in State Legislatures from 1971-1994," *Social Science Quarterly* 86(4): 779-91.
- Pearce, Diana M. 1978. "The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work, and Welfare." *Urban and Social Change Review* 11(1-2): 28-36.
- Peffley, Mark, Jon Hurwitz, and Paul Sniderman. 1997. "Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime." *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 30-60.
- Plotnick, Robert D., and Richard F. Winters. 1985. "A Politico-Economic Theory of Income Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 79: 458-73.
- Plotnick, Robert D., and Richard F. Winters. 1990. "Party, Political Liberalism, and Redistribution: An Application to the American States." *American Politics Quarterly* 18(4): 430-58.
- Poggione, Sarah. 2004a. "Exploring Gender Differences in State Legislators' Policy Preferences." *Political Research Quarterly* 57: 305-14.
- Poggione, Sarah. 2004b. "Legislative Organization and the Policymaking Process: The Impact of Women State Legislators on Welfare Policy." Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans.
- Preuhs, Robert R. 2006. "The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American States." *Journal of Politics* 68(3): 585-599.
- Preuhs, Robert R. 2007. "Descriptive Representation as a Mechanism to Mitigate Policy Backlash: Latino Incorporation and Welfare Policy in the American States." *Political Research Quarterly* 60(2): 277-292.

- Public Opinion. 1982. "Opinion Roundup: Women and Men: Is a Realignment Under Way?" *Public Opinion* April/May: 21, 27-32.
- Raphael, Jody. 1999. "The Family Violence Option: An Early Assessment." *Violence Against Women* 5(4): 449-466.
- Reingold, Beth. 2000. *Representing Women: Sex, Gender, and Legislative Behavior in Arizona and California*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Reingold, Beth. 2008. "Women as Office Holders: Linking Descriptive and Substantive Representation." In *Political Women and American Democracy*, ed. C. Wolbrecht, K. Beckwith and L. Baldez. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reingold, Beth, Kathleen A. Bratton, and Kerry L. Haynie. 2009. "Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures and Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender." Paper presented at the American Empirical Series, Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society.
- Roberts, Dorothy. 1997. *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Rule, Wilma. 1981. "Why Women Don't Run: The Critical Contextual Factors in Women's Legislative Recruitment." *Western Political Quarterly* 34(1): 60-77.
- Rule, Wilma. 1990. "Why More Women Are State Legislators: A Research Note." *Western Political Quarterly* 43(2): 437-48.
- Saint Germain, Michelle A. 1989. "Does Their Difference Make a Difference? The Impact of Women on Public Policy in the Arizona Legislature." *Social Science Quarterly* 70: 956-68.
- Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. "Political Parties and the Recruitment of Women to State Legislatures." *Journal of Politics* 64(3): 791-809.
- Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006. "State Elections: Where Do Women Run? Where Do Women Win?" In *Gender and Elections*, eds. Susan J. Carroll and Richard L. Fox. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schlesinger, Mark, and Caroline Heldman. 2001. "Gender Gap or Gender Gaps? New Perspectives on Support for Government Action and Policies." *Journal of Politics* 63(1): 59-92.
- Shapiro, Robert Y. and Harpreet Mahajan. 1986. "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50:42-61
- Smith, Anna Marie. 2007. *Welfare Reform and Sexual Regulation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University Press.

- Smith, Dorothy. 2010. *Poverty and Opportunity: State Poverty Task Force Recommendations*. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy.
- Smooth, Wendy G. 2008. "Gender, Race, and the Exercise of Power and Influence." In *Legislative Women: Getting Elected, Getting Ahead*, ed. Beth Reingold. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Soss, Joe, Meghan Condon, Matthew Holleque, and Amber Wichowsky. 2006. "The Illusion of Technique: How Method-Driven Research Leads Welfare Scholarship Astray." *Social Science Quarterly*. 87(4): 798-807.
- Soss, Joe, Sanford Schram, Thomas Vartanian, and Erin O'Brien. 2001. "Setting the Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolution Revolution." *American Journal of Political Science*, 45, 378-95.
- Soss, Joe, Sanford Schram, Thomas Vartanian, and Erin O'Brien. 2003. "The Hard Line and the Color Line: Race, Welfare, and the Roots of Get-Tough Reform." In S.F. Schram, J. Soss, and R.C. Fording, eds. *Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Sparks, Holloway. 2003. "Queens, Teens, and Model Mothers." In *Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform*, eds. Sanford F. Schram, Joe Soss, and Richard C. Fording. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Springer, Melanie J., and Elizabeth Rigby. N.d. "Does Electoral Reform Decrease or Increase Political Inequality?" *Political Research Quarterly* forthcoming. (Earlier version presented at the Ninth Annual Conference on State Politics and Policy, Durham, NC, 2009.)
- Squire, Peverill. 2007. "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited," *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 7(2): 211-227.
- Swers, Michele L. 2002. *The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thomas, Sue. 1994. *How Women Legislate*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Tolbert, C. J., and G. A. Steuernagel. 2001. "Women Lawmakers, State Mandates and Women's Health." *Women & Politics* 22 (2):1-39.
- Volden, Craig. 2002. "The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits?" *American Journal of Political Science* 46(2): 352-63.
- Welch, Susan. 1978. "Recruitment of Women to Public Office." *Western Political Quarterly*

31(3): 372-80.

Welch, Susan. 1985. "Are Women More Liberal than Men in the U.S. Congress?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 10: 125-134.

Weldon, S. Laurel. 2004. "The Dimensions and Policy Impact of Feminist Civil Society: Democratic Policymaking on Violence Against Women in the Fifty U.S. States." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 6(1): 1-28.

Weldon, S. Laurel. 2006. "Women's Movements, Identity Politics and Policy Impact: A Study of Policies on Violence Against Women in the 50 U.S. States" *Political Research Quarterly* 58 (1): 111-122.

Williams, Lucy A. 1995. "Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate." *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 22: 1159-96.

Wolbrecht, Christina. 2002. "Female Legislators and the Women's Rights Agenda: From Feminine Mystique to Feminist Era." In *Women Transforming Congress*, ed. Cindy Simon Rosenthal. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Table 1. Single Axis Model
The Impact of Women, Blacks, and Latinos in State Legislatures on TANF Policies, 1998

	1. Eligibility Index (OLS)	2. Flexibility Index (OLS)	3. Family Cap (Logit)	4. Domestic Violence Time Limit Waivers (Logit)	5. Cash Benefits (OLS)
Legislative Incorporation					
Female Incorporation	-0.024 (0.017)	-0.072 (0.427)	-0.224 (0.520)	0.309 (0.435)	-12.878 (6.107)**
Black Incorporation	0.022 (0.032)	1.092 (0.787)	-0.301 (0.869)	-0.990 (0.793)	12.240 (11.453)
Latino Incorporation	0.016 (0.023)	1.407 (0.575)**	-0.249 (0.633)	-1.050 (0.590)*	9.095 (8.408)
Control Variables					
Percent Black and Latino Population	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.142 (0.070)**	0.081 (0.089)	0.127 (0.074)*	-1.469 (1.014)
Citizen Ideology	-0.003 (0.001)**	0.089 (0.027)**	-0.021 (0.033)	-0.028 (0.028)	0.814 (0.408)*
Democratic Control of Legislature	-0.036 (0.022)	0.154 (0.544)	-0.134 (0.685)	1.386 (0.655)**	-2.836 (7.925)
Unemployment Rate	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.279 (0.467)	-0.526 (0.620)	0.476 (0.446)	-6.834 (6.544)
Unmarried Birth Rate	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.066 (0.105)	-0.042 (0.127)	0.006 (0.105)	2.749 (1.546)*
Percent High School Graduates	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.224 (0.137)	-0.014 (0.162)	0.151 (0.126)	1.438 (2.178)
Moralistic Political Culture	-0.067 (0.042)	0.045 (1.06)	-1.718 (1.455)	0.904 (1.177)	6.923 (15.330)
Baseline Dependent Variable (1996)	0.0176 (0.119)		3.547 (1.419)**	0.057 (0.865)	0.976 (0.046)**
Constant	1.078 (0.484)**	27.012 (13.133)**	3.836 (15.821)	-16.987 (12.094)	-196.042 (199.185)
Number of States	49	47	49	48	49
F-statistic	3.25	2.58			114.66
P-value	0.0035	0.0180			0.0001
LR²			30.76	12.28	
P-value			0.0012	0.3432	
Adjusted or Pseudo R²	0.34	0.26	0.46	0.19	0.96

Standard errors in parentheses

*Denotes significance at 0.1 level (two-tailed)

**Denotes significance at 0.05 level (two-tailed)

Table 2. Intersectional Model
The Impact of White Women, Women of Color, and Men of Color in State Legislatures on TANF Policies, 1998







	6. Eligibility Index (OLS)	7. Flexibility Index (OLS)	8. Family Cap (Logit)	9. Domestic Violence Time Limit Waivers (Logit)	10. Cash Benefits (OLS)
Legislative Incorporation					
"White" Women	-0.028 (0.017)	-0.069 (0.417)	-0.228 (0.525)	0.485 (0.461)	-15.762 (5.799)**
Women of Color	-0.048 (0.028)*	1.208 (0.683)*	0.035 (0.796)	-1.398 (0.722)*	15.164 (9.723)
Men of Color	-0.002 (0.026)	1.324 (0.624)**	-0.365 (0.726)	-0.505 (0.643)	4.048 (8.892)
Control Variables					
Percent Black and Latino Population	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.189 (0.076)**	0.072 (0.094)	0.162 (0.080)**	-2.227 (1.070)**
Citizen Ideology	-0.003 (0.001)**	0.086 (0.027)**	-0.021 (0.033)	-0.025 (0.029)	0.853 (0.390)**
Democratic Control of Legislature	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.027 (0.522)	-0.145 (0.674)	1.547 (0.653)**	-3.622 (7.349)
Unemployment Rate	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.212 (0.434)	-0.558 (0.605)	0.444 (0.416)	-6.020 (6.107)
Unmarried Birth Rate	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.044 (0.113)	-0.020 (0.143)	-0.062 (0.119)	3.890 (1.601)**
Percent High School Graduates	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.204 (0.137)	-0.006 (0.163)	0.130 (0.127)	2.529 (2.152)
Moralistic Political Culture	-0.072 (0.043)	-0.038 (1.045)	-1.741 (1.438)	0.714 (1.147)	7.473 (14.802)
Baseline Dependent Variable (1996)	0.214 (0.121)*		3.407 (1.461)**	-0.109 (0.882)	0.953 (0.044)**
Constant	1.208 (0.498)	25.582 (13.279)*	2.853 (16.078)	-13.816 (12.515)	-300.521 (198.693)
Number of States	49	47	49	48	49
F-statistic	3.09	2.75			125.51
P-value	0.0049	0.0125			0.0001
LR²			30.81	14.65	
P-value			0.0012	0.1990	
Adjusted or Pseudo R²	0.32	0.28	0.47	0.23	0.97





Standard errors in parentheses





*Denotes significance at 0.1 level (two-tailed)

**Denotes significance at 0.05 level (two-tailed)

Figure 1. Change in the Dependent Variables over Time







APPENDIX

Coding the Institutional Incorporation Variable (based on Preuhs 2006)

Our models include factor scores of the incorporation of women, blacks, Latinos, “white” women, women of color, and men of color into state legislatures. For each group, the factor score consists of three elements: the percent of legislative seats held by group members, the percentage of social service committees chaired by group members, and group institutional incorporation. Following Preuhs (2006), we measure institutional incorporation as follows:

(Upper Chamber Institutional Incorporation + Lower Chamber Institutional Incorporation)/2

$$\text{Institutional Incorporation} = \frac{\sum W_{pist} P_{pist}}{W_{pist}}$$

Chamber power is determined for a group m , in each chamber i , in each state s , in year t . P is coded as 1 if p is occupied by a group member, 0 otherwise. W is the weight given to each position, p . The chamber power score is scaled such that the range is from 0 to 100. A score of 100 indicates that group members hold all institutional positions in the chamber; 0 indicates that no positions are held.

Lower Chamber Weights: 10 for presiding officer or top-ranked majority leader (depending on whether the top-ranking leader of the chamber is elected by the full chamber or by the majority party, respectively); 8 for top-ranked or second-ranking majority party leader (depending on whether the top-ranking leader of the chamber is elected by the full chamber or by the majority party, respectively) and fiscal committee chairs; 7 for rules committees chairs; 6 for other committee chairs; 5 for top-ranked minority leader

Upper Chamber Weights: 10 for presiding officer or top-ranked majority leader (depending on whether the top-ranking leader of the chamber is elected by the full chamber or by the majority party, respectively); 8 for top-ranked or second-ranking majority party leader (depending on whether the top-ranking leader of the chamber is elected by the full chamber or by the majority party, respectively) and fiscal committee chairs; 7 for rules committee chairs; 6 for other committee chairs; 5 for top-ranked minority leader

Table A1. Independent Variables (1997)

Variable	Description	Descriptive Statistics (Mean/St. Dev./Range)	Sources
Female Legislators	Percent of total legislative seats held by group members	21.62/8.19/4.29-42.86	Center for American Women and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University
Female Social Services Committee Chairs	Percentage of Social Services committees chaired by group members	33.07/30.08/0-100	<i>State Yellow Book</i> (1997 Spring edition)
Female Institutional Incorporation (see Preuhs 2006)	See description on page one of the appendix	15.43/9.14/0-38.9	Council of State Governments' <i>State Leadership Directory</i> (1997)
Female Representation and Incorporation Factor Score	Factor score of group member legislators (descriptive representation), social services committee chairs, and institutional incorporation	-0.90/1.07/-2.16-2.50	Kathleen A. Bratton, Kerry L. Haynie, and Beth Reingold, unpublished state legislative dataset (For more details, see: Bratton, Haynie, and Reingold, "Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Representation: The Changing Landscape of Legislative Diversity." In <i>The Book of the States</i> , 2008; Reingold, Bratton, and Haynie 2009.
Black Legislators	See description for women above	7.04/7.03/0-25.29	Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, <i>Black Elected Officials Roster</i> (1997)
Black Social Services Committee Chairs		9.24/17.02/0-50	
Black Institutional Incorporation		4.78/5.98/0-24.43	National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), <i>National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials</i> (1997)
Black Representation and Incorporation Factor Score		-0.03/0.91/-0.84-2.34	
Latino Legislators	See description for women above	2.82/6.44/0-35.71	
Latino Social Services Committee Chairs		3.74/12.85/0-50	
Latino Institutional Incorporation		2.86/9.72/0-58.63	
Latino Representation and Incorporation Factor Score		-0.03/1.00/-0.41-5.09	
"White" Women Legislators	See description for women above	18.80/8.70/0.71-41.27	
"White" Women Social Services Committee Chairs		28.54/29.50/0-100	
"White" Women Institutional Incorporation		13.74/9.37/0-38.91	

Variable	Description	Descriptive Statistics (Mean/St. Dev./Range)	Sources
"White" Women Representation and Incorporation Factor Score		-0.04/1.11/-1.94-2.60	
Women of Color Legislators	See description for women above	2.87/2.64/0-9.82	
Women of Color Social Services Committee Chairs		4.53/12.81/0-50	
Women of Color Institutional Incorporation		1.69/2.88/0-12.95	
Women of Color Representation and Incorporation Factor Score		-0.12/0.86/-0.84-3.09	
Men of Color Legislators	See description for women above	6.95/6.93/0-27.68	
Men of Color Social Services Committee Chairs		8.45/16.58/0-50	
Men of Color Institutional Incorporation		5.99/9.23/0-52.76	
Men of Color Representation and Incorporation Factor Score		-0.00/1.03/-0.89-4.03	

Table A2. Control Variables (1997)

Variable	Description (if necessary)	Descriptive Statistics (Mean/St. Dev./Range)	Source
Percent Black and Latino Population	Percent black population plus percent Latino population	16.62/11.78/1.17-42.53	U.S. Census Bureau, "Estimates of the Population by Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin for the United States and States," http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/character/
Citizen Ideology		46.40/15.35/13.72-86.19	William D. Berry, Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, Russell L. Hanson. 1998. "Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93." revised 1960-2006 citizen and government ideology series. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> , Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan.), pp. 327-348.
Democratic Control of Legislature	Party control of state legislature; 0=unified Republican control; 0.5=one chamber split, other Republican; 1=split control; 1.5=one chamber split, other Democratic; 2=unified Democratic control	1.05/0.89/0-2	Klarner, Carl. 2003. "The Measurement of the Partisan Balance of State Government." <i>State Politics & Policy Quarterly</i> . 3(3): 309-319
Unemployment Rate		4.65/1.08/2.4-7.1	University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, http://www.ukcpr.org/AvailableData.aspx
Unmarried Birth Rate		31.28/5.42/16.59-45.41	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, National Vital Statistics System, "Demographic Characteristics of Mother by State/County" (1996-2006), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss.htm
Percent High School Graduates		83.13/4.36/74.7-92.1	U.S. Census Bureau, Table 13: Educational Attainment of the Population 25 Years and Over, By State (1996-2006), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/educ-attn.html
Moralistic Political Culture		0.34/0.48/0-1	Elazar, Daniel J. 1984. <i>American Federalism: A View from the States</i> , 3 rd edition. New York: Harper & Row.

Table A3. Dependent Variables (1998)

Variable	Descriptive Statistics (Mean/St. Dev./Range)	Source
Replicated Eligibility Index	0.53/0.12/0.22-0.71	Welfare Rules Database, http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/WRDWelcome.cfm
Fellows & Rowe's Flexibility Index	7/2.77/1-12	Fellows, Matthew C., and Gretchen Rowe. 2004. "Politics and the New American Welfare State." <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 48(2): 362-73.
Family Cap	0.58/0.50/0-1	Welfare Rules Database, http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/WRDWelcome.cfm
Domestic Violence Time Limit Waivers	0.61/0.49/0-1	Welfare Rules Database, http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/WRDWelcome.cfm
Cash Benefits (adjusted for annual state-level cost of living)	515.24/180.19/178.17-1208.15	University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, http://www.ukcpr.org/AvailableData.aspx ; Berry, William D., Richard C. Fording, Russell L. Hanson. 2000. "An Annual Cost of Living Index for the American States, 1960-1995." <i>The Journal of Politics</i> 62(2): 550-567.