

Who Wins (and Who Loses) in Class-Based Political Parties?

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Abstract

The American electorate is increasingly stratified along class lines—with low-income voters aligned with the Democratic Party and wealthier voters aligned with the Republican Party. A substantial body of research examines the causes of this shift, with less attention paid to assessing its policy consequences. In terms of policy outcomes, the degree to which income-party stratification benefits the rich versus poor is in question—with earlier research concluding that class-based politics promotes redistribution and more recent work associating class-based political parties with the general decay of the social safety net and calling advocates to facilitate cross-class political coalitions. Seeking to clarify these conflicting accounts of “who gets what” from class-based politics, I use longitudinal data (1980-2005) on states’ spending priorities to test my expectation that the influence of class-based politics depends on its interaction with two other (related) political dynamics: racial politics and party politics. Findings confirm that it is the racial characteristics of the rich and poor that moderate the impact of class-based Democratic parties on redistributive outcomes.

American politics is increasingly stratified by class—with low-income voters more likely to align with the Democratic party and higher-income voters more solidly Republican (Stonecash 2000; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, 2003). At the same time, increasing income inequality has further divided Americans in terms of economic resources (Neckerman 2004) resulting in larger numbers of both rich and poor Americans divided into two polarized political parties (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Assessing the redistributive consequences of this movement toward class-based political parties is the primary aim of this paper. Specifically I examine whether the poor are rewarded with more redistribution as they become a more solidly-Democratic constituency or would be better off in a cross-class political system, as well as the degree to which these rewards depend on the electoral success of Democratic versus Republican policymakers.

It is possible that heightened class-based politics serve to produce more redistribution via a Democratic party focused on securing benefits for its core constituency. Indeed, Jennings (1979) found that class-based Democratic parties were more likely to pay attention to the concerns of the poor by expanding social welfare benefits when they held control. Yet, at the same time, a class-based Republican party would also have more reason to oppose redistribution in order to reward their higher-income constituency. To minimize this class conflict and maximize their electoral prospects, Democratic parties may back away from redistributive policy proposals, as suggested by recent work on policy responsiveness that finds limited responsiveness by either party to the preferences of the poor (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; forthcoming), particularly in poor places where class most polarizes economic policy preferences (Rigby and Wright, forthcoming).

It is my expectation that, in a class-based political system, the degree to which Democratic parties back away, rather than produce redistributive benefits for their lower-income constituency depends on the concurrent racial politics at play. To the degree that the poor Democrats are members of minority groups, it is easier for opponents of redistribution to pit the rich and poor against each other, and harder for supporters to generate a shared sense of concern across social groups (Hero 1998). In contrast, these more divisive politics are less effective in more homogeneous communities. Further, minorities may be viewed as a captured constituency by the Democratic party, rather than low-income whites who may be viewed as a swing constituency critical to putting together a winning coalition.

This joint focus on race and class is not new in the study of redistributive politics. Policy scholars examining the historic development of American policies and institutions have long noted the pervasive and inter-woven effects of class- and race-based politics on the development of our social welfare state (e.g., Gilens 1999; Katznelson 2005; Quadagno, 1994; Soss, Fording and Schram 2008), as have scholars of cross-national welfare states (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Yet, much of the research on class-based patterns of partisanship and participation pay more attention to class than to the racial dynamics known to limit redistributive policymaking (Soss et al 2001; Fording 2003; Fellows and Rowe 2004; Hero & Tolbert 1996).

An exception to this bi-furcated literature is found in Brown's (1995) study of party cleavages among states in which he found different levels of welfare provision in states he labeled as the "Southern Party System," in which political conflict was stratified by both race and class, and those classified as "New Deal Party Systems" in which partisan identification was stratified primarily along class-lines (and to a lesser degree religious lines). Specifically, Democratic Party control led to more generous welfare spending in New Deal states, with no

effect found among Southern party states. Brown (1995) interprets these results as indication that class-based political cleavages were more likely to redistribute wealth, at least when Democrats were in control. However, since both Southern and New Deal party systems were stratified by class, I interpret his findings to support my expectation that the impact of class-based political cleavages will depend on the level of race-based political polarization at play.

Background

Over the last 25 years, two trends have combined to magnify the importance of income and class in structuring American politics. First, patterns of voting and partisanship are increasingly stratified by income with low-income Americans identifying as Democrats and higher-income Americans more solidly Republican (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, 2003). Stonecash (2000) illustrated the development of this class cleavage produced by poorer voters in non-Southern states moving steadily toward the Democratic Party, while affluent Southern voters changing their allegiance from the Democratic to Republican party. At the same time, economic and political developments have spurred an increase in income inequality—the gap between those at the top versus the bottom of the income distribution (Kelly 2005; 2009; Neckerman 2004), which has further separated the economic fortunes of the electorate. Combining these two trends, we now have larger numbers of both rich and poor Americans—with each group more concentrated in one of two polarized political parties (Stonecash 2000; Stonecash et al. 2003).

This class-based polarization of the electorate can have important implications for political conflict. As parties are generally presumed to represent the interests of their base constituencies, income stratification likely contributes to the parties pursuing very different redistributive policies (Powell 1982). Indeed there is a long history of comparative research on

class cleavages in party systems (Alford 1963; Lipset 1981), which are found to relate to the policy outputs of these systems. Yet, the direction of these effects in the United States is less clear. There are reasons to expect that class-based politics would produce more redistribution by solidifying the importance of the low-income constituency to the Democratic party. Indeed, Jennings (1979) found that class-based Democratic parties were more likely to pay attention to the concerns of the poor. Conversely, class-based politics may simply serve to further marginalize citizens already disadvantaged in terms of economic fortunes—producing a political context in which the interests of one group are easily pitted against those of another, while also making it much harder to generate a shared sense of concern across class divisions (Hero 1998). Recent work on policy responsiveness reinforces this notion, finding limited responsiveness of both political parties to the preferences of the poor (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; forthcoming), particularly for redistributive policy in poor places (Rigby and Wright, forthcoming).

Variation in the Class-Basis of State Party Systems

With the growth in class-based politics, it is important to identify the consequences of this form of political organization—particularly for redistributive policymaking. To do this, I turn to the American states, which provide a unique testing ground for examining the influence of class-based politics on redistributive policymaking. Although political parties increasingly draw from distinct coalitions stratified by income (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Stonecash 1999; 2000), we know that state party systems vary in the degree to which they organize around class-based dimensions (Brown 1995; Dye 1984; Erikson et al. 1993; Fenton 1966; Garand 1985; Gelman et al. 2007; Jackson and Carsey 1999; Jennings 1979). For example, a study examining Presidential voting showed how the income-vote slope varies across states from the strongest relationship in Mississippi in which the rich are much more likely to

vote Republican to the least stratified state (Connecticut) in which there is almost no relationship between individuals' income and vote choice (Gelman, Bafumi, Shor, and Park 2006).

This variation is not surprising since, although every state has both a Democratic and Republican party, these parties are decentralized institutions that chart their own path to electoral success. The states vary a great deal in their ideological preferences and the parties adapt to these state contexts rather than following lock-step with the national party platforms (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). This is why candidates for the Democratic Party in Texas take a different position on many issues than their counterparts in New York. Since parties respond to state-level political ideology and demographics—moderating their positions in order to gain party identifiers and larger shares of legislative seats, it is expected that they will adopt positions in alignment with their constituents (Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993). The question at hand is whether strategic Democratic parties increase or decrease their push for redistribution when responding to a constituency with more concentrated economic disadvantage, as well as how the answer to this question may depend on the racial politics that likely interact with these class-based political dynamics.

The Intersection of Race and Class in Redistributive Politics

Policy scholars examining the historic development of American policies and institutions have long noted the pervasive and inter-woven effects of class- and race-based politics on the development of our social welfare state (e.g., Gilens 1999; Katznelson 2005; Quadagno, 1994; Soss, Fording and Schram 2008), as have scholars of cross-national welfare states (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Yet, much of the research on class-based politics focuses on income differences in political behavior (e.g., Avery and Peffley 2005; Bartels 2008; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Anderson 1995; Ringquist et al. 1997), with less

attention to the racial dynamics known to structure redistributive policymaking (Soss et al 2001; Fording 2003; Fellows and Rowe 2004; Hero and Tolbert 1996). Similarly, the research on racial politics tends to overlook the inter-sectionality of race and class.

An exception to this bi-furcated literature is found in Brown's (1995) study of party cleavages among states. Examining a range of social groups (e.g., income, race, gender, religion, urbanity), Brown compared the contribution of each to the parties constituency base. These results helped him identify common patterns of social cleavages among the states, as well as test the policy implications of these differences. The clearest difference was found between his "Southern Party System," in which political conflict was stratified primarily by race (but also by class) and the "New Deal Party Systems" in which partisan identification was stratified primarily along class-lines (and to a lesser degree religious lines). Democratic Party control led to more generous welfare spending in New Deal states, with no effect found among Southern party states. Yet, this party stratification varies across place with state party systems varying in the degree to which they organize around race- versus class dimensions (Brown 1995; Gelman, et al 2006; Jennings 1979).

Brown (1995) interprets these results as indication that class-based political cleavages were more likely to redistribute wealth. However, since both Southern and New Deal party systems were also stratified by class, I interpret his findings to support my hypothesis that class-based political cleavages can lead to redistribution—but this depends on whether or not they also overlap with racial cleavages in the state. This potential interaction is highlighted as well by Stonecash (2000) in his book *Class and Party in American Politics* in which he acknowledges the role of race in shaping distinct patterns of class-based political development in the South. Yet, he notes that "Much more analysis is necessary to try to disentangle the role of race and

class in the South and elsewhere in the nation” (p.110). A similar call for investigating overlapping politics of race and class (and gender) was voiced by Hochschild (2009) in her review of Bartel’s (2008) book, *Unequal Democracy*, in which she calls on him, as well as all political scientists, to “address the intersection of two or more axes of inequality rather than allowing one to predominate” (p. 147).

Potential Consequences of Class-Based Parties

Assessing the policy consequences of class-based politics is important for understanding redistributive politics, as well as for assessing the role of party politics in shaping economic outcomes for low-income Americans. To this end, in the analysis that follows, I use longitudinal data on state-level patterns of partisanship, as well as measures of state redistributive spending from 1980-2005 to test five potential ways that class-based political dynamics may be associated with redistribution.

1. **Direct Positive Influence:** The most optimistic expectation is that class-based politics serves to increase redistributive spending, likely by making the Democratic party more focused on the needs of their low-income constituents.
2. **Direct Negative Influence:** It is also feasible that class-based parties undermine cross-class coalitions in ways that serve to limit redistribution and sharing of resources across social groups.
3. **No influence:** Class-based politics may simply reflect other elements of demographic, electoral and political contexts and not contribute any additional influence on the level of redistributive policy adopted.
4. **Dependent on Parties’ Electoral Success:** It seems most likely that class-based parties serve to heighten the importance of party control with greater redistribution when

Democrats are elected in greater numbers, but less when Republican candidates experience more electoral success.

5. Dependent on Partisanship of Low-income Whites: Another possibility is that the racial composition of poor Democrats and wealthy Republicans affect whether low-income Democrats are rewarded for their concentration in the Democratic party.

Data and Measurement

In order to measure the class-basis of the state party system, as well as assess the consequences for redistributive policymaking, I undertook a longitudinal analysis (1980-2005) mapping the level and change in patterns of partisanship at the state-level, as well as tested the relationship between changes in these group-based political cleavages and redistributive spending in the states.

Measuring Redistribution

I use a new measure of policy spending priorities generated by Jacoby and Schneider (2009). Drawing from *State Government Finances*: an annual report of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Jacoby and Schneider (2009) used a spatial proximity model to identify similarities and differences across state spending in nine areas: corrections, education, government administration, health, highways, hospitals, parks and natural resources, law enforcement, and welfare. Based, not on their subjective classification, but the underlying structure of these data, Jacoby and Schneider note that the primary distinction in state spending divides spending on health, hospitals and welfare (which they call particularized benefits) from spending on the other six areas. Instead of using the absolute value of state spending, which is clearly confounded with GSP, I will use their unfolded estimates from the spatial distance analysis, which capture the relative amount of state resources allocated to redistributive purposes (health care, hospitals,

welfare versus other policy areas).¹ This measure of state redistributive policy priorities ranges from -1.87 in WY in 1984 to 2.30 in New York in 1997 (M=.02, sd=.77). Figure 1 presents the mean value on this redistribution measure for each state (averaged over the full time period).

Measuring Class-Based Cleavages

The dataset used for this estimation was generated by pooling together the public opinion polls conducted by the NYT/CBS polling organization from 1980 to 2003. In this pooled dataset, there were 502,625 individual cases that included a state identifier, with ninety-four percent of these cases (N=468,304) having non-missing data on respondents income. The other cases were dropped from the analysis. Although these polls asked different questions, they all tended to ask respondents for basic demographic questions, as well as for their partisan identification. (Additionally, they typically ask for ideological self-placement providing the data used in the early, ground-breaking work on state-level ideology and policy responsiveness, *Statehouse Democracy* by Erikson, Wright, and McIver).

The first step in estimating class-based political cleavages was to generate a common measure of income across surveys. In most cases, the NYT/CBS poll asked for respondents' income using categorical response options that range in the number of options from four to seven. Posing an additional challenge, the cut points for these categories changed over time, as did the substantive meaning of a particular income. In order to classify respondents by income across these diverse income questions, as well as across 25 years of data, I standardized responses for each survey-month so that the average income question response in each of the 300 months was recoded zero, with a standard deviation of one. From these standardized income scales, I simply divided the sample in half (at the 50th percentile) generating a crude distinction

¹ Since Jacoby and Schneider (2008) measure the relative investment in more universal (vs. particularized) benefits, I take the inverse of their measure for each state-year as my measure of states' redistributive effort.

between lower-income and higher-income respondents. Clearly, I would have preferred to have developed more fine-grained income groups. However, I prioritized the reliability that came from larger cell sizes, particularly since later in the analysis I divided each income half by race (non-Hispanic white or minority). As a result, it is likely that I under-estimate any income-group differences in partisanship, as well as their impact on redistribution, rather than over-estimate them.

Once I had the individual-level data in which individuals were coded as low-income or higher-income, I used the variable asking respondents for their partisan affiliation (including leaners) to estimate the partisan gap for each group. Following the procedure used by Brown (1999) to estimate the contribution of each social group to each political party, I began by taking the proportion of each political party that were classified as low-income. Brown (1995) describes these proportions as the underlying coalition making up each party's supporters. By design, this approach considers both the patterns of partisan affiliation (e.g., the poor are more likely to affiliate as Democrats) and the size of the group (e.g., some states have more poor people than do others). It also serves to difference out any state-level tendency for people to affiliate with one party or the other.

This process was repeated for each state-year, employing a four-year moving average.² Finally, these state-year-level measures of each group's contribution to each party were used to estimate the magnitude of the partisan gap. This is simply the difference between the proportion of Democrats who were classified as low-income and the proportion of Republicans who were classified as low-income. If this value is positive then it indicates a greater dependence on low-income constituents for the Democratic party; if it is negative it indicates a greater dependence

² In order to increase the robustness of these measures, I took a moving average of years to estimate each state-year. This moving average included the year in question (i.e. 1990) and the three prior years (in this example: 1987, 1988, and 1989).

on low-income constituents among the Republican party. This measure averages .10 (sd=.07) but varies among state-years from -.24 to .33. Figure 2 presents a map with the mean value of this class gap for each state. And Figure 3 present mean value of this class gap throughout the time period of study.

To generate race-specific measures of class cleavages, I repeated the same process but divided each party's constituency into four groups: low-income whites, low-income minorities (including Hispanics/Latinos), higher-income whites, and higher-income minorities. As shown in Table 1, a partisan gap was identified for each of the four groups, with the largest being for high-income whites whose -.15 (sd=.09) value indicated a larger contribution to the Republican party, followed by low-income minorities whose .08 (sd=.07) indicates a greater contribution to the Democratic Party. High-income minorities also contributed more to the Democratic party (.05, sd=.04), while low-income whites were the most evenly divided between the two parties (.02, sd=.07). Figure 4 presents the mean value for each state, for each of the four measures of partisan gaps. Most notable are the differences between the states with large partisan gaps among poor minorities, versus poor whites. In fact, Figure 5 repeats the earlier time trends for low-income and high-income gaps illustrating the divergent racial patterns within each group. Specifically, the low-income partisan gap is almost entirely made up of the increased contribution of poor minorities to the Democratic party. In contrast, the partisan gap among poor whites never contributed much to the gap, and has been declining over time The de-composition of the high-income gap by race illustrates a different pattern in which high-income minorities have minimized the severity of the high-income skew toward the Republican party—due to their greater concentration in the Democratic party.

Accounting for Other State-level Factors

To account for other factors likely to shape (a) states' redistributive priorities, (b) class and racial cleavages, and (c) the relationship among these things, I use two strategies. First, all models include state- and year-fixed-effects. The state-fixed-effects absorb stable characteristics of states, while the year-fixed effects account for national trends (such as those evidenced in Figures 2 and 4). The second strategy is to use a set of control variables to account for time-varying factors that are likely to impact the relationships of interest. These include measures of economic resources (per capita GSP measured in 2005 constant dollars, the poverty rates, and a measure of income inequality) and political factors (citizen ideology/policy mood, percent non-Hispanic whites, and indicators of Democratic party strength—a dummy variable for whether the governor is a Democrat and an average of the percent Democratic legislators in each chamber). Table 1 provides sources and descriptive statistics for these variables, following those for the redistribution and partisan gap measures described above.

Modeling Policy Consequences of Class-Based Parties

To examine the relationship between states' political cleavages and the priority they place on redistributive spending functions, I estimated state- and year-fixed-effects models employing panel-corrected standard errors (xtpcse). Further, due to the auto-regressive nature of the redistributive policy measure, the models are adjusted for a panel-specific AR1 correlation. Table 2 presents the key models examining the hypothesized relationships, with the measure of redistribution serving as the dependent variable across all the models. The first model regresses the measure of redistribution on the set of control variables—providing a baseline for the models that follow. Model 2 adds the measure of income-party gap (pooling together whites and minorities). This coefficient is not significant ($b=-.07$, $se=.13$) providing some support for the

notion that class-based parties have no direct effect on the level of redistributive policy enacted. Model 3 adds a variable interacting the measure of income-party gap with the measure of Democratic strength within the legislature (average proportion Democratic across both chambers). This coefficient is marginally significant ($b=.1.03$, $se=.55$) suggesting that the influence of class-based political dynamics may differ when Democrats versus Republicans control the policymaking process. The marginal effect of an increase in the income-party gap is presented in Figure 6 illustrating a more positive influence on redistributive spending when parties are class-based AND Democrats have secured a large proportion of the legislative seats. In contrast, class-based parties under substantial Republican control are likely to reduce redistribution.

Models 4 and 5 repeat the previous two models using instead the income-by-race measures of partisan gaps. Again, I find little direct relationship between these patterns of partisanship and redistributive effort. But, these measures have an indirect influence via Democratic party strength. For two groups: low-income whites and high-income minorities, their relative concentration in the Democratic party is rewarded with more redistribution when Democratic candidates are more successful in getting elected. However, this relationship is not found for low-income minorities whose partisanship patterns have no influence on levels of redistribution even when they are loyal Democratic constituents and the Democratic party holds control of the legislatures. These marginal effects are presented in Figure 7—illustrating that these effects are concentrated on the extremes in which legislatures are primarily Republican (resulting in less redistribution) or primarily Democratic (resulting in more). For the vast majority of more competitive legislative arrangements, these class-based patterns of partisanship have little influence on levels of redistribution.

Preliminary Conclusions

This paper examined the policy consequences of the recent rise in class-based political parties in the U.S. Despite the theoretical reasons to believe that class-based parties would result in more redistribution, as well as those that suggest less redistribution would follow, I found only a small, marginally-significant, increase in redistribution—and only when the Democratic party experienced more electoral success. Of course, the inverse of this relationship is that cross-class parties generated more redistribution when state party systems were highly skewed toward the Republicans rather than the Democrats.

The other aim of this paper was to consider the inter-sectionality of race and class in this recent upswing in class-based politics. The data assembled for this project illustrate stark differences in the racial composition of class-based party systems, with the growth in this income-party stratification driven by an increase in the relative contribution of low-income minorities to the Democratic versus Republican party. This is likely a function of the increased diversity among Americans rather than a shift in patterns of partisanship among these low-income minorities. The degree to which low-income whites are concentrated in the Democratic party was always much lower, and has declined in recent years with a slight skew toward the Republican party at the end of the time-series (2003). This does not mean that low-income whites are more likely to identify as Republicans, but that they constitute a slightly larger share of the Republic party than they do for the Democratic Party (which is increasingly made up by minority group members).

The results indicate that it is the greater contribution of these low-income white voters to the Democratic party that leads Democratic parties to return greater redistribution, while the concentration of loyal low-income minorities to the Democratic party does not seem to shape

redistributive politics. And minimizing the influence of class-based politics, the greater concentration of high-income minorities also leads to more redistribution when Democrats are successful in getting elected. In the next steps of this project, I will examine whether redistribution (at all, as well as under Democratic party control) serves to shift the class- and race-based patterns of partisanship in future election-cycles.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	M	sd	Min	Max	Source
Spending					
Redistribution (t+1)	0.00	0.77	-1.87	2.30	a
Class Cleavage					
Low-Income	0.10	0.07	-0.24	0.33	b
Low-White	0.02	0.07	-0.24	0.25	b
Low-Minority	0.08	0.07	-0.07	0.39	b
High-White	-0.15	0.09	-0.44	0.24	b
High-Minority	0.05	0.04	-0.07	0.20	b
State Context					
Per Capita GSP	32.89	6.57	19.68	63.34	c
Poverty Rate	13.17	4.07	2.90	27.20	c
Gini Coefficient	0.37	0.03	0.31	0.45	d
Ideology (Citizen)	47.81	14.63	8.45	95.97	e
% Non-Hisp Whites	83.51	10.04	51.14	99.15	f
Gov = Dem	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	c
Dem Legislators	0.57	0.17	0.14	0.98	c
Time					
Year	1992	6.64	1981	2003	

Data Sources:

- a. Schneider & Jacoby
- b. CBS/NYT poll data
- c. UKY CPR dataset
- d. Western et al
- e. Berry et al
- f. US Census

Table 2. Redistribution, by Class Cleavage

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
State Context					
Per Capita GSP	-0.01 *	-0.01 *	-0.01 *	-0.01 *	-0.01 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Poverty Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gini Coefficient	-2.62 *	-2.62 *	-2.69 *	-2.67 *	-2.58 *
	(0.93)	(0.93)	(0.94)	(0.94)	(0.93)
Ideology (Citizen)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% Non-Hisp Whites	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gov = Dem	0.03 +	0.03 +	0.03 +	0.03 *	0.03 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Dem Legislators	-0.26 *	-0.25 *	-0.33 *	-0.22 +	-0.42 *
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Class Cleavages					
Low-Income		-0.07	-0.59 +		
		(0.13)	(0.30)		
High-White (omitted)					
Low-White				-0.11	-0.85 *
				(0.13)	(0.37)
Low-Minority				0.25	0.45
				(0.26)	(0.61)
High-Minority				0.00	-1.75 *
				(0.35)	(0.83)
Party X Cleavage					
Dem X Low			1.03 +		
			(0.55)		
Dem X High-White (omitted)					
Dem X Low-White					1.49 *
					(0.65)
Dem X Low-Min					-0.13
					(0.98)
Dem X High-Min					3.42 *
					(1.51)
<i>Observations</i>	1081	1081	1081	1081	1081
<i>Number of id</i>	47	47	47	47	47
<i>R-squared</i>	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.78

Note: Coefficients from fixed-effect models employing panel-corrected standard errors. Models are adjusted for panel-specific AR1 correlations. * p<.05, + p<.10.

Figure 1. Average Redistribution Score, by State




Figure 2. Average Class-Party Gap, by State




Figure 3. Change in Class-Party Gap, 1980-2003




Figure 4. Class-Party Gap, by Race






Figure 4. Class-Party Gap, by Race (Cont.)

Gap: High-Income, Minorities



Gap: High-Income, Whites




Figure 5. Change in Class-Party Gap, by Race





Figure 6. Relationship between Class-Party Gap and Redistribution, by Party Strength




Figure 7. Relationship between Class-Party Gap and Redistribution, Each Group

